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I. Introduction
In June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Russo,1 the Supreme Court
of the United States invalidated a Louisiana statute requiring
abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a nearby
hospital,2 following the Court’s similar decision in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt.3 The opinion did not explicitly overrule Roe
v. Wade,4 but nevertheless, it left uncertainties regarding the
Court’s abortion rights jurisprudence.5
Another type of reproductive privacy, the freedom to have
offspring, is on the opposite side of the coin from a right of
abortion.6 Governments have denied the freedom to have offspring,
also considered the right to procreate, in a number of countries.7
Lawmakers enacted statutes that destroyed the fertility of
citizens.8 People suffering from a seizure disorder, for example,

1. See June Med. Serv., L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133 (2020)
(stating that Louisiana’s “admitting privileges” statute was unconstitutional).
2. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (West 2020).
3. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016)
(stating that a Texas statute’s requirements on abortion-performing doctors were
unnecessary, and therefore placed an undue burden on the constitutional right to
seek an abortion).
4. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing the
constitutionally protected right to seek an abortion).
5. See Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“I joined in the
dissent in Whole Women’s Health and continue to believe that the case was
wrongly decided.”); see Jessica Glenza, Abortion Rights Case is First Test for
Right-Leaning US Supreme Court, GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2020) (clarifying that the
terms “reproductive right” and “reproductive privacy” are used to mean a person’s
liberty interests in initiation and continuation of pregnancy (procreation),
termination
of
pregnancy
(abortion),
and
rearing
of
infants)
[https://perma.cc/3LC6-6HMZ].
6. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing that the
right to procreation is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. See, e.g., Sexual Sterilization Act, S.A. 1928, c 37 (Can.) (enabling forced
sterilization of mental hospital inmates upon their release).
8. See PHILIP R. REILLY, THE SURGICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 30–87 (1991) (clarifying that
compulsory sterilization is a medical procedure that deprives a person’s ability to
reproduce).
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were involuntarily sterilized at the peak of the eugenics
movement.9
In the United States, to permanently deprive targeted citizens
of their freedom to procreate, as many as twenty-eight states
enacted sterilization statutes by 1931.10 Vigorous constitutional
challenges ensued,11 with the challengers initially prevailing.12
These victories did not last long, however, because eugenicists

9. See DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE
USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 253–56 (Alfred A. Knopfy ed.) (1985) (explaining the
role of genetic screening programs in the height of the eugenics movement and
specifically a voluntary screening program for Tay-Sachs carriers in 1971, a
disease which results in seizures); Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a
Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV.
833, 841–48 (1986) (explaining the early twentieth century theory of
Malthusianism, which was concerned not just about the quantity of the
population, but also the quality, and was therefore concerned with the question
of who produced the population); Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. Bell,
and The History of Equal Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 120–24 (2005)
(analyzing Harry Laughlin’s proposed model for eugenic sterilization law, which
in part hinged on the argument that the state’s policing power encompassed
compulsory eugenic sterilization in the prevention of menace which arguably
applied to natural classes of degenerates, including the epileptic, feebleminded,
criminals, and insane); Lisa Powell, Eugenics and Equality: Does The
Constitution Allow Policies Designed to Discourage Reproduction Among
Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 563 (2002) (explaining that
eugenics is a study about inheritance of human characteristics such as
intelligence, epilepsy, and criminality, and it aimed to improve the “wellbeing of
the society” by changing people’s mating behaviors).
10. See Powell, supra note 9, at 484–88 (exploring the vast array of groups
targeted by the eugenic movement in America, including racial minorities, the
poor, criminals, people with mental disabilities, and other socially unpopular
groups, all of which were deemed genetically defective and doomed to reproduce);
see also Robert J. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell: “Felt Necessities” v. Fundamental Values?,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1418, 1423–32 (1981) (stating that by 1927, twenty-eight out
of forty-eight states passed compulsory sterilization laws).
11. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 111–13, 115–24 (detailing the early
challenges to state sterilization laws and the constitutional grounds on which
some challenges succeeded).
12. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world,
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”).
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enacted “reinforced” sterilization laws that incorporated various
procedural safeguards.13
The tragedy of eugenics did not end in these pieces of
legislation.14 In 1927, the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s
“reinforced” sterilization statute as constitutional and approved
the forced sterilization of an intellectually challenged woman
named Carrie Buck.15 By adding legitimacy to eugenics
movements,16 Buck v. Bell17 demonstrated the real danger of
common misconceptions clouding the minds of Justices during
judicial review.18
Now that classical eugenics has been proven to be a
pseudoscience,19 it is surprising to find courts still citing to Buck v.
13. See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 30, 36–37 (1985) (noting that Virginia forced the
sterilization of women before discharge from a psychiatric institution); see also
Siegel, supra note 9, at 120–32 (detailing the successful defenses of refined
sterilization laws from constitutional challenges).
14. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“It is better for all the world,
if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”).
15. See id. at 207 (upholding the constitutionality of Virginia’s sterilization
statute).
16. See id. at 207 (“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”); Box v.
Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 139 S. Ct. 1786–87 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Court threw its prestige behind the eugenics movement.”);
Lombardo, supra note 13, at 33 (describing that Buck would not have issued if
three close political associates had not used the specious “scientific” tenets of
eugenics to legitimate their private prejudices).
17. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
18. See People v. Barrett, 281 P.3d 753, 778 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting)
(“Buck v. Bell reflected then prevalent attitudes toward persons with mental
disabilities.”); Cynkar, supra note 10, at 1457–60 (explaining that the paucity of
cited references in Buck shows the predominance of the eugenics-driven
atmosphere over the administration of justice); Lombardo, supra note 13, at 33
(describing that Buck would not have issued if three close political associates had
not used the specious “scientific” tenets of eugenics to legitimate their private
prejudices).
19. See Clarence J. Ruddy, Compulsory Sterilization: An Unwarranted
Extension of the Powers of Government, 3 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5–10 (1927)
(critiquing the scientific and legal justification for sterilization of certain groups
of people such as seizure patients); Arthur B. Dayton, Book Review, 39 YALE L.J.
596, 597 (1930) (questioning the whole problem of heredity, birth control, and
sterilization as applied to eugenics); see also Lene Koch, The Meaning of Eugenics:
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Bell as good law.20 To determine whether Buck v. Bell and Roe v.
Wade are still good law, this Article examines the nature of
reproductive privacy rights and the methods of judicial review in
various jurisdictions.21
Using insights from Professor Stephen A. Simon’s Universal
Rights and the Constitution, this Article argues that national
courts should continue to assume an active role in the protection
of privacy rights by giving due consideration to the nature of the
privacy right in combination with the merits of the universal right
theory.22 This Article then demonstrates that both foreign national
courts and domestic state courts have recognized the right to
procreate and key aspects of the right to abortion as fundamental
rights.23
Part II introduces the universal right theory, explaining why
the theory is particularly relevant to the protection of privacy, in

Reflections on the Government of Genetic Knowledge in the Past and the Present,
17 SCI. CONTEXT 315, 317 (2004) (explaining that State courts later noted the
tragedy of eugenics); see e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981) (stating
that compulsory sterilization based on eugenic theories can no longer be justified
as a valid exercise of governmental authority).
20. See, e.g., Jeffrey F. Ghent, Validity of Statutes Authorizing
Asexualization or Sterilization of Criminals or Central Defectives, 53 A.L.R.3d 960
(2019) (observing that many of the state sterilization statutes were upheld
against the constitutional challenge); see Roberta Cepko, Involuntary
Sterilization of Mentally Disabled Women, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 122, 123
(1993) (stating that courts cite Buck as a case of authority on the sterilization of
mentally incompetent individuals); Powell, supra note 9, at 503 (citing Board of
Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001)) (stating that Buck was cited
favorably as recently as 2001).
21. The “privacy rights” in this Article refer to a right, freedom, and liberty
that guards bodily integrity, familial and other intimate relationships (including
contraception and burials), reproduction, parenthood (including education),
happiness in life, including a right to be left alone, as the nature and origins of
these liberties all share the same implications regarding an individual’s
autonomy and dignity. Because of the complexity of the law regarding privacy
rights in relation to the space allotted for this Article, this Article focuses on the
cases, statutes, and practices that implicate the reproductive aspects of the
privacy rights. See infra Part II.
22. See Stephen A. Simon, UNIVERSAL RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014)
(examining and critiquing the Court’s reasoning for its constitutional rights
jurisprudence).
23. See id. (emphasizing the widespread recognition of the right to abortion).
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contrast to textualist Justices’ skepticism towards the theory.24
Part III provides an overview of reproductive privacy law in the
United States and foreign jurisdictions. It highlights the judicial
acknowledgement that reproductive freedom underpins human
dignity and autonomy.25 Part IV then examines representative
methods of judicial review in various jurisdictions, showing the
remarkable similarities in the courts’ analyses.26 In conclusion,
this Article identifies the role of judicial review based on the
universal right theory, the convergence in the applicable standards
of review, and the diminished precedential value of Buck v. Bell.27
II. The Universal Rights of Human Dignity and Autonomy
Privacy has been called and understood as a naturally
conferred right.28 Although the Constitution was initially silent as
to the right of privacy, that silence was broken by the addition of
the Fourteenth Amendment29 following the Civil War.30
The right to procreate and the right to abortion have been
declared as fundamental rights.31 As such, the Court should apply
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV. The majority of domestic courts elect to apply strict
scrutiny in both sterilization cases and in abortion cases, with few courts making
determinations under a balancing test or by using rational basis. See cases cited
infra notes 37–38.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905)
(declaring that a right to be left alone is a natural right by stating “every man is
entitled to enjoy a right to privacy, whether out of society or in it”); see also 16A
Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 405 (1994) (“Of those rights now-called
‘fundamental rights . . . practically all of them were at one time deemed natural
rights by the American founding fathers.”).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
30. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated
Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 795, 810–13 (1996) (discussing the various interpretive theories
that the Court has used when recognizing new rights under the Constitution);
Thomas C. Grey, The Use of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI-KENT. L. REV. 211,
218–19 (1988) (describing the process through which the Court found a right to
privacy within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. The Constitution guarantees certain “zones of privacy” covering family
relationships and child rearing. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
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strict scrutiny in the judicial review of statutes that limit one’s
freedom to procreate or to abort.32 Nevertheless, the right to
reproduce and the right to abortion have not always enjoyed the
benefit of strict scrutiny, and the protection for these rights have
been deemed “confusing at best.”33
In examining the relevance of dignity and autonomy to the
protection of privacy under substantive due process, subsequent
discussions explore whether there is, or whether there should be,
a universal right of privacy and a corresponding uniform standard
of judicial review in reproductive privacy cases.
A. Embodiments of the Universal Rights Theory for Essential
Liberties
In his book Universal Rights and the Constitution, Professor
Simon introduced the concept of universal rights as a way to confer
constitutional protection to those rights universally accepted as
indispensable.34 Fighting against a traditional judicial reluctance
to import natural law principles,35 Professor Simon elucidated the
(recognizing that marriage is a freedom protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(recognizing that the right to have or not to have children is protected under the
right to marital privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing that
the right to terminate a pregnancy is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recognizing that the right
to use or not to use contraception falls within the constitutionally-protected right
to marital privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down
Oklahoma’s forced sterilization statute as unconstitutional).
32. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing standard of review for fundamental rights); Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.3d
634, 665 (Ala. 2011) (Murdock, J., concurring) (discussing the reasoning of
applying strict scrutiny to review of fundamental rights).
33. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–82 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d,
570 U.S. 744 (2013) (applying rational basis review to an equal protection claim).
34. See Simon, supra note 22, at 3–4 (describing universal law theory and its
roots in natural law).
35. See id. at 5–6, 25, 31–33, 36, 45–46 (explaining that universal rights are
not bound by history or prevailing attitudes, nor are a product of mechanical
derivation from natural law or a certain ideology, and discussing whether a
consensus existed on the indispensable character of the right); see also Peter B.
Bayer, Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and Constitutional “Due
Process” Part II, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 165, 253–57 (2019) (explaining why
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critical role that universal arguments have assumed,36 upon the
understanding that universal principles are manifestations of the
original purpose of government itself.37 Textualists, such as Justice
Scalia, have expressed disfavor towards universal arguments.38 In
particular, Justice Scalia cautioned that any reliance by the Court
on international sources may lead to a wrong conclusion given the
fact that foreign law may not be relevant to domestic law.39 Justice
Scalia also criticized any reliance on a “national consensus,”
because legislatures are better qualified to make a final decision.40
The presumption of constitutionality, however, will not always
stand, particularly when the legislative act limits the procreative
freedom of a politically neglected population, and this freedom is
one that directly defines a person’s life and happiness.41
concepts of natural rights and human dignity were ignored by U.S. courts); John
D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV.
655, 710 (2008) (“While a few cases have paid lip service to the notion that
unreasonable impositions on dignity give rise to a Fourth Amendment
violation, this notion has been underdeveloped in the case law, limited largely to
brief invocations and inconsistent application.”).
36. See Simon, supra note 22, at 3 (“The study of universal arguments is vital
to the study of constitutional law and theory regardless of one’s ideology or
research agenda.”).
37. See id. at 18 (“A government lost legitimacy if it violated the mandates
of natural law. Locke held that the people retained the right to remove a
government that transgressed their rights . . . .”).
38. See id. at 55–57 (citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 607–08 (1990)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)) (conducting a word-for-word review of constitutional
amendments and describing the rights enumerated therein); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 89–90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I fear to see the
consequences of the Court’s practice of substituting its own concepts of decency
and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of
departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights.”); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (claiming that the Court’s interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment was improper as it was not supported by the text nor
history of the Constitution); see also Simon, supra note 22, at 65 (clarifying that
the approach shared by these opinions is called “fixed exclusivism”).
39. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the majority opinion discarded the will of US citizens in favor of
the “international community”).
40. See id. at 608 (“[The Court’s decision] finds, on the flimsiest of grounds,
that a national consensus which could not be perceived in our people’s laws barely
15 years ago now solidly exists.”).
41. If the premise that legislative acts are constitutional is not justified, the
criticism against the universal arguments also fails. See Marbury v. Madison, 5
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In the nineteenth century, the Court consulted state and
foreign practices, reaching the conclusion that a presumption of
innocence is a constitutional requirement.42 Similarly, the Court
struck down the capital punishment of juvenile offenders because
of the growing consensus among states and foreign nations.43
These decisions have redefined the constitutional protection and
harmonized it with national and international standards
whenever the liberty is critical to the life and happiness of
powerless groups.44 The Court’s aspiration to defend “human
dignity” surfaces whenever the right is harmed by cruel
punishment or by the application of excessive enforcement.45
Privacy right cases provide another footing for arguments
utilizing the universal right theory.46 Recent decisions from foreign
jurisdictions have prompted the Court to revisit old privacy

U.S. 137, 176–78 (1803) (establishing the Supreme Court’s ability to consider
whether legislation is constitutional, and to render the law null and void if it is
not); Garland E. Allen, The Social and Economic Origins of Genetic Determinism:
A Case History of the American Eugenics Movement, 1900–1940 and Its Lessons
for Today, 99 GENETICA 77, 81 (1997) (“[E]ugenicists lobbied in a number of state
legislatures on behalf of compulsory sterilization laws for institutionalized
individuals deemed to be ‘genetically inferior.’”).
42. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (discussing
“fundamental human dignity”); see also Death Penalty–Execution of the Insane,
100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 102 (1986) (observing that a ban on executing the insane
offended contemporary understandings of human dignity).
43. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 821, 821–23 (1988) (discussing
“evolving standards of decency”). The same universal approach in Atkins v.
Virginia produced the exclusion of mentally disabled defendants from capital
punishment. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (recognizing
the trend of the global community away from executing mentally impaired
individuals).
44. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831 n.34 (detailing prohibitions on executing
juveniles in other nations).
45. See Simon, supra note 22, at 50 (“Justice Brennan outlined an approach
that centered on normative analysis according to the universal principle that a
‘punishment must not by its severity be degrading to human dignity.’”).
46. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003) (“The right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human
freedom in many other countries.”); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965) (“The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”).
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opinions and to depart from them.47 The risk of irreversible
damage to targeted individuals, in addition to the inadequate
democratic process to speak for “undesired citizens,” propelled the
Court’s internationalism, as evident in the Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment cases, as well as in the Fourteenth
Amendment criminal due process cases.48
For instance, in Lawrence v. Texas,49 the justices noted that a
person’s full enjoyment of “liberty” without stigma is paramount in
the substantive due process analysis,50 and that the ability to
engage in homosexual activities should fall within that “liberty”
because “the stigma this criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not
trivial.”51
The Court recognized that privacy—the freedom one exercises
to appreciate the meaning of life and to preserve self-control—lies
at “the heart of liberty”52 (hereinafter “essential privacy”).53 In its
47. See Stephen A. Simon, The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in
Constitutional Rights Cases: An Empirical Study, 1 J.L. & CTS. 279, 294 (2013)
(“[The Atkins, Lawrence, and Roper opinions] not only relied on foreign law in
support of a rule at odds with the challenged legislation but did so to support the
overturning of recent precedents on the basis of intervening changes in societal
values.”).
48. The statutes restricting individuals’ essential privacy rights in the areas
of marriage, reproduction, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education may cause the elimination of the targeted group through the
destruction of their value of life, an equivalent to the death penalty in terms of
their spiritual or bodily integrity. See supra note 38, 39 and accompanying text.
49. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (hold the Texas statute criminalizing
homosexual conduct as unconstitutional).
50. The term “liberty” may indicate pre-constitutional freedom that every
person enjoyed without the government’s interference. Justice Douglas explained
that “[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties,” when concluding that privacy rights are no less important
than any other right. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86 (discussing the sacred
importance of the right to privacy); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77 (“[T]he right [to
privacy] has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other
countries.”).
51. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (describing the “consequential nature” of
the criminal statute) (emphasis added).
52. See id. at 575 (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”).
53. See id. (describing privacy as the “heart of liberty”); see also Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (stating “the
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elucidation of the importance of the freedom to engage in
homosexual conduct, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas consulted
both state law and foreign principles.54
Additionally, the Lawrence v. Texas opinion observed that the
Texas statute specifically impacted those individuals deemed
outliers to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.55 The
powerlessness of the affected population was a catalyst for the
justices to take a closer look and to adopt an international
perspective.56 Because marginalized groups often yield to essential
privacy restrictions, which are difficult to reverse, those
individuals lose their autonomy and happiness, as well as follow a
course of decline.57 Cross-jurisdictional consideration is warranted
to save their dignity and autonomy.58
Thus, the application of the universal right theory is urged to
prevent serious, irreversible restrictions upon essential privacy
and to neutralize a distorted democratic process. As Justice
Brennan previously pointed out, the ultimate goal of the

ultimate control over her destiny and her body” as implicit in the meaning of
liberty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (describing the
control of contraception use as “a maximum destructive impact upon that
relationship” within the zone of privacy); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2608 (2015) (describing the profoundness of marriage and the right to marriage
granted under the Constitution).
54. See People v. Barrett, 281 P.3d 753, 778–81 (Cal. 2012) (Liu J.,
dissenting) (reflecting on history of eugenics in the United States); see also Pooja
Nair, Litigating Against the Forced Sterilization of HIV-Positive Women: Recent
Developments in Chile and Namibia, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 223, 227–31 (2010)
(reflecting on legal remedies in forced sterilization victims in Chile and Namibia).
55. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (acknowledging
historical condemnation of homosexual conduct as immoral and shaped by
religious tradition).
56. See id. at 572–73 (examining cases under the purview of European Court
of Human Rights).
57. See Simon, supra note 22, at 36–41, 50–53 (describing the universal
approach in substantive due process cases involving privacy, such as Lawrence v.
Texas, and explaining the importance of judicial scrutiny in Eighth Amendment
cases).
58. See Allen, supra note 41, at 84–85 (comparing historical trends in
Germany and United States regarding minority groups and imposed restrictions);
see also José Miguel Vivanco, The Tyranny of Majorities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Jan. 19, 2017), (describing the absence of judicial check and human right
violations in Venezuela) [https://perma.cc/3MYR-CYB7].
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Constitution is to guarantee dignity and autonomy, and this
coincides with the merits of the universal right theory.59 Thus, the
universal right theory can insulate the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment from majoritarian attacks.60
In essential privacy cases, arguments based on the universal
right theory should be introduced. Both domestic and international
cases have been integral to the developing contour of essential
privacy.
B. Making the Universal Right Theory Work for Reproductive
Privacy
Even when the universal right theory guides the Court’s quest
for “liberty” under the Fourteenth Amendment, there have been
concerns about the Court “expanding liberty” through judicial
scrutiny.61 Both freedom from sterilization and freedom of abortion
are fundamental rights. 62 Yet, the Court has not declared strict

59. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 439 (linking the protection of
human autonomy and dignity); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“The right of a man to the protection of his own
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”).
60. See Simon, supra note 22 and accompanying text for Professor Simon’s
summary of the use of the universal right theory. See also Saikrishna Prakash &
John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539–40
(2005) (criticizing foundations of judicial review).
61. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500–01 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (noting concern of judicial interpretations being restrained); Skelly
Wright, The Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial
Activism in an Age of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 487, 489
(1987) (discussing judicial activism as judging in the service of conscience);
William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1992) (noting judicial activism as “natural law or basic notions of
humanity”).
62. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (describing
sterilization as the deprivation of a basic liberty); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973) (recognizing the right of personal privacy and personal rights as
fundamental).
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scrutiny to be the standard for evaluating essential privacy
restrictions.63
Under the separation of powers doctrine, unnecessary judicial
activism is discouraged.64 Therefore, the use of a strict standard
should be adequately constrained to avoid unjustifiable judicial
interference into legislative power. Additionally, the notion of
“core” of “liberty,” which is called “dignity” and “autonomy,”
requires further elucidation by courts.65
Nevertheless, these self-limiting mechanisms should not
preclude the Court’s more informed analysis of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the universal right theory.66
First, the universal right theory is not identical to judicial
activism.67 Rather, it simply serves to add viewpoints independent
from that of legislatures.68 Majority groups have successfully
deprived a targeted group’s reproductive freedom to eliminate its
existence.69 Controlling votes in political branches tend to favor
majoritarian propaganda and to discount any negative
63. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–82 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d,
570 U.S. 744 (2013) (recognizing doctrinal instability of “dignity”); Erin Daly, The
H. Albert Young Distinguished Lecture in Constitutional Law Constitutional
Comparisons: Emerging Dignity Rights at Home and Abroad, 20 WIDENER L. REV.
199, 200–01 (2014) (discussing absence of clear standard of judicial review in
Windsor).
64. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (noting
importance of government with limited powers).
65. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (explaining the respect
the Constitution demands for autonomy); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (describing limits of Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act
with respect to people’s dignity).
66. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 312, 412 (1997) (describing the perception of the invalidation of majoritarian
statutes to minority populations as problematic).
67. Compare Simon, supra note 22 (introducing universal right theory) with
Wright, supra note 61, at 489 (describing judicial activism).
68. See Crump, supra note 30, at 854–56 (discussing test for deciding
whether case involves a fundamental right).
69. See Laura I Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The
Forgotten History of Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L. J. 417, 448
(2018) (discussing historical success of eugenicists and Nazis); Genocide Trade
Bill Row: Peers Back New Amendment in Lords Debate, BBC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2021)
(describing congressional solicitation for “judicial experience” over the allegation
of genocide in a foreign country) [https://perma.cc/9D4S-PAQ2].
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constitutional implications.70 As such, when the human dignity
and autonomy of a minority population is endangered,71 the
universal right theory ensures that judges are provided with the
unbiased guidance of state and foreign courts.72
Second, the exercise of a protected “liberty” is an
individualized question and a phenomenon remote from voting
processes.73 For instance, political representation involves sharing
concerns and personal values of others, but representatives may
not share what lies at the heart of someone else’s “liberty” to
protect it.74 Devastating consequences to affected individuals are
often difficult to be explained and understood in congressional
debates.75 Accordingly, a more “searching” judicial review is
justified, and multicultural, multijurisdictional viewpoints should
check whether “natural powers of a minority” have been left out by
legislative discussion.76

70. See Siegel, supra note 9, at 110–14 (discussing popular opinion on
sterilization statutes).
71. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative
Action, Sodomy, and Supreme Court Politics, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 4 (2005)
(introducing Lawrence v. Texas as a representative opinion that protected the
interests of disadvantaged groups); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (discussing the failure of democracy
and human right violations against minority groups); see also supra notes 38–40
and accompanying texts (covering historical examples of judicial decisions
regarding harmed minority populations).
72. See Allen, supra note 41, at 81 (describing the challenge to the
constitutionality of sterilization laws in Buck v. Bell); José Miguel Vivanco, The
Tyranny of Majorities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 19, 2017) (describing the
absence of judicial check and human right violations in Venezuela)
[https://perma.cc/3MYR-CYB7].
73. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (discussing liberty and
the rights of the individual man).
74. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 190–92 (2011) (discussing different concepts of dignity
and times when they conflict).
75. See Simon, supra note 22, at 104–08 (recognizing the justifiable use of
universal principles in issues involving human dignity and the seriousness of
harms); see also Rao, supra note 74, at 193 (2011) (describing human dignity as a
moral, philosophical, and religious concept).
76. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 880 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing the important context for guiding judicial discretion).
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The value of dignity and autonomy has been “clearly accepted
as universal.”77 And the exercise of reproductive freedom is
paramount to the sense of personhood and happiness.78 Hence,
courts should examine corresponding state decisions and foreign
decisions to determine the constitutionality of essential privacy
regulations.79
III. Reproductive Rights are Essential Privacy and Universal
Rights
This Part shows that the right to procreate and several key
aspects of the right to abortion constitute essential privacy in a
majority of jurisdictions,80 and that the universal right theory
should supplement the Court’s analysis of reproductive privacy
restrictions.81

77. Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 848, 848–50 (1983). See infra Part II (discussing privacy right opinions
that relied on human dignity and autonomy in state and foreign jurisdictions).
78. A right to procreate and core aspects of a right of abortion have been
found to be considered essential privacy by the United States Supreme Court. See
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–
54 (1973) (recognizing the choice to have or not to have a child as a liberty that
affects the physical and psychological integrity of a pregnant woman, and the risk
of stigmatization against unwed mothers).
79. See Simon, supra note 22, Chapter 3 (discussing Universal Arguments
in Constitutional Law); id. at 24 (comparing the theory’s relation to “law of
nation” and “common law”); id. at 61 (pointing out the requirement of
elucidation).
80. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (finding amendment
prohibiting protections for homosexuals unconstitutional); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (describing personal decisions related to contraception
and procreation as constitutionally protected); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644,
662–64 (2015) (describing “personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs” as
fundamental liberties); Simon, supra note 22, at 45 (noting privacy rights as
fundamental rights).
81. See Simon, supra note 22, at 45 (describing courts should take active
role in privacy right protection).
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A. Reproductive Privacy in the United States
A right of procreation and a right of abortion constitute
essential privacy to the extent that procreative decision-making is
indispensable to dignity and autonomy.82 As this subsection
illustrates, the Court has assumed the primary responsibility for
the protection of reproductive freedom.83
1. The U.S. Constitution and Privacy Protection
A right to procreate and a right of abortion are fundamental
freedoms protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 Skinner v
Oklahoma85 was the first milestone in establishing the idea of
essential privacy.86 The Court struck down a sterilization statute
that targeted larceny convicts, noting that the statute concerned a
fundamental right to procreate.87 Griswold v. Connecticut88 later
anchored the freedom of contraceptive access to the zone of privacy
created by the “fundamental” constitutional guarantees,89 and
invalidated Connecticut’s intrusion into a married couple’s
contraceptive use. The Griswold Court applied a level of scrutiny
82. If reproductive rights were arbitrarily restricted, there would be
devastating effects to those affected. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (describing
sterilization as an irreparable injury); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (noting obtaining birth control as right of privacy free from government
intrusion); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (finding right of personal privacy includes
abortion).
83. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (describing the sterilization act as a
deprivation of a basic liberty); Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (describing the State’s
interests in regulations of factors governing abortion); but see Powell, supra note
9, at 504 (stating “reproductive privacy is less likely to reach policies that do not
place a large burden on reproduction”).
84. See supra notes 58, 77–78 and accompanying texts.
85. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding the enforcement of state sterilization act as
unconstitutional).
86. See id. at 536 (invalidating statute for lack of rational basis while
recognizing that strict scrutiny is applicable for restrictions of a fundamental
right).
87. Id. at 541–43.
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. See id. at 485 (holding Connecticut law forbidding contraceptives
unconstitutional).
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that had been usually applied to restrictions on one’s freedom of
association.90
Along with Skinner and Griswold, later cases have held that
a right of abortion may not be restricted unless there is a
compelling state interest.91 The trimester framework in Roe v.
Wade92 confirmed that the ability to have an abortion is a
fundamental right and required protection under a stricter
standard.93 The Court held that states cannot interfere until a
fetus becomes viable, at which point a “compelling state interest”
in protecting the health and well-being of a fetus justifies the
intrusion into privacy.94 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey95 applied the undue burden test—which
incorporated Roe’s strict trimester approach—without overruling
Griswold and Skinner.96 Casey and later decisions balanced a
woman’s right to abortion with state interest in fetal health,
maternal health, and moral values.97 In certain abortion cases, the
Court has applied a standard similar to rational basis;98 however,
90. See id. at 485–86 (adopting the same standard of review as in freedom
of association, “unnecessarily broad”); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
(1964) (determining that the government cannot prevent or control activities by
means that unnecessarily broadly invade an individual’s protected freedom).
91. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (protecting the right to an
abortion in the absence of a compelling state interest); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886 (1992) (discussing compelling state interests).
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. Id. at 153 (holding that the decision as to whether to have an abortion
before viability falls within her right to privacy).
94. Id. at 162–63.
95. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
“[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a woman seeking an abortion are
valid if they do not constitute an undue burden”).
96. See id. at 848–49, 877 (declaring that a state regulation is
unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion).
97. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (upholding the state’s
prohibition of partial-birth abortions); see also Harris v. W. Ala. Women’s Ctr.,
139 S. Ct. 2606, 2607 (2019) (affirming the invalidation of the dismemberment
abortion ban).
98. See Powell, supra note 9, at 563 (noting rational basis or similar
standards are often applied in abortion cases); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631
(1996) (explaining access to public funding and resources); see generally Webster
v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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the freedom restricted in those cases could be considered
peripheral to dignity and autonomy when compared with more
direct interferences with women’s abortion rights, such as ban of
abortion.99
In June Medical,100 four Justices applied a balancing test
based on Casey, another four Justices dissented, and Chief Justice
Roberts outlined his interpretation of Casey in a concurring
opinion.101 Since June Medical, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the
balancing test, on the ground that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion
should control.102 According to the Eighth Circuit, Hellerstedt loses
its precedential value since Justice Roberts’ opinion is
controlling.103
The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, did not conclude that
Hellerstedt had been overruled by Justice Roberts’ interpretation
given that dicta should not replace a previously established
framework.104 The Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is consistent
with the fact that Justice Roberts’ opinion supplied a winning vote
to the majority because Justice Roberts admitted that Hellerstedt
was controlling.105
In sum, the right to abortion and the right to have children are
fundamental rights in the United States.106 Restrictions that
99. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (stating that an abortion
should be free from interference).
100. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132 (2020).
101. See id. at 2136 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to assert rights of
third parties when applying the restriction against a litigant would indirectly
affect the third party).
102. See Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 914–916 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding
that Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in June Medical is controlling).
103. See id. at 914 (discussing Chief Justice Robert’s view that Hellerstedt
was wrongly decided).
104. See Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 743
(7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that the “principles of stare decisis called for the Court
to adhere to that earlier result on the essentially identical facts”).
105. Compare Hopkins, 968 F.3d at 914 (explaining that Hellerstedt was
wrongly decided) with Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 991 F.3d. at 743
(stating that the enforcement of the Louisiana law was properly enjoined before
it took effect).
106. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (listing the
“liberties” specially protected by the Due Process Clause, which includes the right
to abortion and the right to have children).
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interfere with an individual’s personal choices that are central to
dignity and autonomy trigger the application of strict scrutiny
under Griswold and Skinner, while states’ compelling interest in
maternal health and well-being of the fetus allows restrictions that
meet Casey’s undue burden test.107 The uncertainties of abortion
rights lie in the interpretation of Casey after Justice Roberts
opined on the interpretation of Casey in June Medical.108
2. Application of Strict Scrutiny Against Sterilization
Today, none of the fifty states in the United States perform
unconsented surgical sterilization for eugenics purposes.109 When
Nazis Germany was defeated, the world understood the danger of
classical eugenics that led to the Holocaust.110
On top of that, the Skinner opinion and civil rights movements
gave rise to the recognition of procreative freedom within the
country.111 Courts have invalidated sterilization laws on the
ground that irreversible surgical sterilization is a cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.112

107. See id. (describing which restrictions trigger which level of scrutiny by
the courts).
108. See Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 914–916 (8th Cir. 2020)
(illuminating ambiguity in Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in June Medical).
109. See Lombardo, supra note 13.
110. See Daniel J Kelves, Eugenics and Human Rights, 319 BMJ 435, 438
(1999) (stating that the Holocaust strengthened the moral objections to eugenics);
Laura I Appleman, Deviancy, Dependency, and Disability: The Forgotten History
of Eugenics and Mass Incarceration, 68 DUKE L.J. 417, 448 (2018) (“World War II
and the effort to defeat the Nazi regime momentarily stemmed the tide of
enthusiasm for eugenics and its rhetoric.”).
111. Skinner has played a critical role in the establishment of privacy rights
and the expansion of substantive due process. Alfred L. Brophy & Elizabeth
Troutman, The Eugenics Movement In North Carolina, 94 N.C.L. REV. 1871, 1917
(2016). Moreover, coerced sterilizations and degrading conditions in state mental
institutions prompted the deinstitutionalization movement. See id., at 1926–28
(discussing attitudes towards sterilizations at state mental institutions); ROBERT
MORRIS LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL
DISABILITIES, at 19 (1996).
112. See Catherine Rylyk, Lest We Regress to the Dark Ages: Holding
Voluntary Surgical Castration Cruel and Unusual, Even for Child Molesters, WM.
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Additionally, some sterilization statutes were held to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirement.113 Ultimately,
many sterilization laws were repealed because of their violation of
human rights.114
Natural law concepts influenced early privacy cases.115
Contrasting Buck with Skinner, the Supreme Court of California
reasoned that the coerced sterilization of intellectually challenged
people is an infringement to the “natural right” of procreation.116
Skinner guided state courts to the adoption of heightened
scrutiny.117
The majority of state court opinions require that the
sterilization of intellectually challenged persons should be the last
resort; that sterilization procedures may be initiated only by a
director of the institution in which a subject resides or by a director
of social services; that sterilization must be in the best interest of
the subject; that clear, strong, and convincing evidence support a
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1305, 1327 (2008) (explaining the impact that Skinner had
on sterilization laws).
113. See Smith v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963, 966 (N.J. 1913)
(discussing the discrimination against confined individuals); Mickle v. Henrichs,
262 F. 687 (D. Nev. 1918) (holding that vasectomy of criminals violative of
Nevada’s unusual punishments provision); Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413 (S.D. Iowa
1914), rev’d on other grounds, 242 U.S. 468 (1917) (noting a due process violation).
114. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 817 (1986) (stating
that some states have banned sterilizations of incompetent persons).
115. See infra note 117 (listing early privacy law cases which were influenced
and informed by concepts of natural law).
116. See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 26 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating a denial of
marriage license).
117. See In re Grady, 246 A.2d 467, 475 (N.J. 1981) (noting a natural right
origin of privacy); Hudson v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 310, 311–12 (Ala. 1979) (noting
the lost significance of Buck); In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368–69 (Colo. 1981)
(requiring evidence that sterilization is the only remedy to further a compelling
interest); V.H. v. K.E.J. 887 N.E.2d 704, 715 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (affirming the
denial of a petition for tubal ligation); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383, 1384–
86 (M.D. Ala. 1974); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 636 (Wash. 1980)
(discussing the sterilization requirements); In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Mass.
1982) (noting that there is no sterilization on the basis of state or parental
interest); Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196, 1202 (D.D.C. 1974) (holding that
minors’ consent is generally required); N. Carolina Ass’n for Retarded Child. v.
State of N.C., 420 F. Supp. 451 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (showing strict procedural
requirements).
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conclusion that the subject is likely to engage in sexual activity
without the use of contraceptive devices; that scientific and
medical knowledge does not suggest either (a) that a reversible
sterilization procedure or other less drastic contraceptive method
will shortly be available, or (b) that science is on the threshold of
an advancement in the treatment of the individual’s disability; and
that the subject is incapable of caring for a child, even with
reasonable assistance.118 In sum, sterilizations are performed as
the last resort and under extremely strict conditions.
3. Strict Scrutiny and Other Tests in Abortion
Thirty-eight states have enacted feticide laws that generally
prohibit the abortion of a fetus.119 Some of those statutes have
targeted non-therapeutic abortions, disguised as a measure to
advance health of pregnant women and well-being of a fetus.120
Abortions of a fetus with a detected heartbeat have been banned.121
118. See In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d at 640–41 (noting that by
limiting compulsory sterilization to cases where less drastic methods will not
shortly be available, and there is no proven treatment, the opinion supports “no
less restrictive” limitation of strict scrutiny); Conservatorship of Maria B., 160
Cal. Rptr.3d 269, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (discussing the medical purpose and
necessity of the sterilization procedure); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707,
714–15 (Iowa 2014) (interpreting a statute to mean that it requires a court’s
approval in arranging a vasectomy of a ward); see also Gerber v. Hickman, 291
F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the prisoner’s right against sterilization).
119. See Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., (last updated May
1, 2018) (listing current states with fetal homicide laws) [https://perma.cc/56H688D2]; see also Marissa Kreutzfeld, An Unduly Burdensome Reality: The
Unconstitutionality of State Feticide Laws That Criminalize Self-Induced
Abortion in the Age of Extreme Abortion Restrictions, 38 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 55,
55–56 (2016) (noting that Indiana is one of the thirty-eight states with feticide
laws).
120. See, e.g., Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding specific purpose of placing an insurmountable obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking the nontherapeutic abortion); see also Greenhouse & Reva B.
Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” Obstructs Choice,
125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1431 (2016) (explaining that it is the court’s duty to ascertain
the actual purpose of laws under Casey).
121. See Laura Bakst, Constitutionally Unconstitutional? When State
Legislatures Pass Laws Contrary to Supreme Court Precedent, 53 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. ONLINE 63, 78 (2019) (illustrating unconstitutional state laws).
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In response, courts in Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois,
Tennessee, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, and Montana have struck
down these restrictions due to a lack of a compelling state interest
after adopting strict scrutiny as the test for determining the
constitutionality of abortion statutes.122
Other courts have reached different conclusions in terms of
what degree of restrictions are permissible. While these opinions
follow Casey’s undue burden test, they have spawned divided
interpretations of Casey. One approach requires courts to closely
examine the state interest a regulation is expected to serve; what
physical, health, and logistical burdens are imposed on women;
and whether the adopted measure and its corresponding
placement of burdens is well-suited to bring about the aims of the
regulation.123 Others solely ask whether there is a debilitating, or
“substantial,” burden upon the freedom of abortion, without a
consideration of the connection between the legislative purpose of
the statute and the imposed burdens.124 In other words, the former

122. See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1138
n.88 (Alaska 2016) (explaining how to prove a compelling state interest); Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 p.2d 797, 825 (Cal. 1997) (describing how the
Florida Supreme Court considered a similar issue by searching for a compelling
state interest); Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1255 (Fla.
2017) (noting that the court has repeatedly applied strict scrutiny for privacy);
Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745, 765-67 (2013) (analyzing
why strict scrutiny applies); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee v.
Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2000) (noting that a right to privacy is
fundamental and shall be subjected to strict scrutiny); Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 239–41 (Iowa 2018) (using
strict scrutiny instead of undue burden test); Hodes & Nauser, MDS, P.A. v.
Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 494–97 (Kan. 2019) (applying strict scrutiny instead of
undue burden test); Women of State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17,
30–32 (Minn. 1995); Armstrong v. State, 989 P.3d 364, 380–82 (Mont. 1999)
(mentioning undue burden test and women’s right to obtain a healthcare provider
of their choice).
123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620,
632–36 (N.J. 2000) (measuring the extent of restriction upon abortion); Moe v.
Sec’y of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 655–60, 417 N.E.2d 387, 402–05 (1981)
(balancing the women’s freedom against state interest).
124. See, e.g., Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 988 (Ind. 2005)
(applying undue burden test in abortion context, but strict scrutiny in privacy
context); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 582–84 (1993)
(explaining what is meant to be a substantial obstacle); Pro-Choice Miss. v.
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approach examines the proportionality and the close relationship,
or nexus, of the abortion restrictions with the corresponding state
interests, while the latter does not.
On balance, a greater number of states apply strict scrutiny
standard or a rigorous undue burden test, not a relaxed undue
burden test.
4. Summary
The right to procreate and the right to have an abortion are
fundamental rights. As Griswold, Skinner, and Roe have held,
courts must strictly scrutinize the constitutionality of restrictions
upon fundamental privacy rights, such as involuntary sterilization
statutes, and the vigorousness of constitutional scrutiny should
not change when intellectually challenged individuals are
targeted; state courts, for instance, inquire whether sterilization is
necessitated by a compelling state interest, whether the regulation
realizes the affected individual’s best interests, and whether the
regulation provides the least invasive process to achieve its
legislative purpose.125
However, courts take different approaches in reviewing
abortion statutes. Federal courts are split in their interpretation
of Casey and June Medical, with the Eight Circuit following Justice
Robert’s concurring opinion, asserting that abortion restrictions
are constitutional under Casey unless there is a substantial
obstacle to pregnant women, while the Seventh Circuit follows Roe,
Casey, and Hellerstedt.126 The majority of state court opinions
require strict scrutiny or a rigorous form of the undue burden test.
Significantly fewer courts apply a less rigorous undue burden
test.127
Fordice, 716 So. 2d 645, 655 (Miss. 1998) (applying the undue burden standard
as a way to reconcile state’s interests).
125. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying texts.
126. Compare Hopkins v. Jegley, 968 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that Hellerstedt was wrongly decided) with Planned Parenthood of
Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Box, 991 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2021) (stating that the
enforcement of the Louisiana law was properly enjoined before it took effect).
127. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying texts.

REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY IN THE WORLD

125

B. Reproductive Privacy in Foreign Countries
Certain privacy rights, including a right to procreate and a
right to safely abort, are protected as fundamental freedom in
many parts of the world because they are indispensable to dignity
and autonomy.128
Eugenics laws permitted sterilization of intellectually
challenged citizens in foreign nations, but they were later repealed
or abolished.129 Foreign courts have also disallowed sterilizations
as a privacy rights violation.
Abortion was previously criminalized or heavily regulated
because of its risk to women’s health, morals, and fetal life.130 In
the Global North, since abortion has become a safe procedure, it
has been deregulated in most territories.131
1. European Law
In Europe, each member state may provide a different degree
of privacy protection. A member state may restrict a right to
abortion and a right of same sex marriage albeit the fact that

128. See Erin Daly, The H. Albert Young Distinguished Lecture in
Constitutional Law Constitutional Comparisons: Emerging Dignity Rights at
Home and Abroad, 20 WIDENER L. REV. 199, 205 (2014) (stating that human
dignity was the ground on which the Constitutional Court of South Africa and the
Supreme Court of Nepal struck down prohibitions on same sex marriage, and
Mexican court allowed a same-sex couple to adopt a child); Allen, supra note 41,
at 77 (discussing genetics, privacy, and autonomy generally); José Miguel
Vivanco, The Tyranny of Majorities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 19, 2017)
(describing the absence of judicial check and human right violations in Venezuela)
[https://perma.cc/R3LQ-25GN].
129. See Jean-Jacques Amy & San Rowlands, Legalised Non-Consensual
Sterilization – Eugenics Put into Practice Before 1945, and the Aftermath. Part 2:
Europe, 23 EUR. J. CONTRACEPTION & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE 194 (2018)
(tracing the history of sterilization laws in Europe, North America, and Japan).
130. Marge Berer, Abortion Law and Policy Around the World: In Search of
Decriminalization, 19 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 13, 14–15 (2017) (noting that
abortion prohibitions were generally introduced for three main reasons: abortions
were dangerous, abortions were considered sinful, and abortions posed a risk to
fetal life).
131. See id. at 14–18 (noting that many countries have decriminalized
abortion as it has become safer).
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discretional margins are limited in many ways.132 The European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) provides a floor for human
rights protection among member states of the Council of Europe.133
Reproductive privacy is protected through the right to private and
family life under Article 8, the right to freedom from torture,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3,
the right to life under Article 2, the right to an effective remedy
under Article 13, and the prohibition of discrimination under
Article 14.134 These provisions are broadly interpreted to cover the
procreative privacy that is essential to human dignity and
autonomy.135
a. Unconsented Sterilization
When it comes to compulsory sterilization, European
authorities consider it a violation of important human rights:
freedom in the body and health, as well as freedom in one’s private
and family life, which includes free decision-making in familial

132. Amendment No. 8/1983, Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 7
October 1983, incorporated as Const. Art. 40.3.3.4. (showing that abortion was
illegal in Ireland); see Dorota A. Gozdecka, Moral Obligation of The State or a
Woman’s Right to Privacy? How Women’s Reproductive Rights Challenged the
Natural Law Tradition in Ireland, 6 NOFO 89, 90–91 (2009).
133. See A Convention to Protect Your Rights and Liberties, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE (“The European Court of Human Rights oversees the implementation of
the Convention in the 47 Council of Europe member states. Individuals can bring
complaints of human rights violations to the Strasbourg Court once all
possibilities of appeal have been exhausted in the member state concerned.”)
[perma.cc/795K-JHRG].
134. See A Convention to Protect Your Rights and Liberties, THE COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, arts. 2, 3, 8, 13, and 14 (listing protections for privacy both through
explicit and implicit means in the convention) [perma.cc/795K-JHRG].
135. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [ECHR] (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.”); see also Evans v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
353, 71 (“‘[P]rivate life’, which is a broad term encompassing, inter alia, aspects
of an individual’s physical and social identity including the right to personal
autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop relationships with
other human beings and the outside world . . . incorporates the right to respect
for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent.”).
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matters.136 The European Court of Human Rights held that the
requirement of sterilization prior to the correction of a transgender
applicant’s birth certificate violated the patient’s right to health
and procreative privacy.137 The court explained that an individual
is entitled to the ECHR’s guarantee of physical and mental wellbeing under Articles 3 and 8.138 It indicated that a non-consensual
sterilization of an adult violates their basic freedom of health,
spiritual and family life, except for therapeutic purposes where a
case of medical necessity has been convincingly established.139
In Czechoslovak regions, Romani women were sterilized
without informed consent, under a eugenics-inspired policy.140
Some sterilized women filed civil lawsuits in national courts and
later settled their claims with defendants.141 Relief was denied to
other women on the ground that the act of coercion was not found

136. See A.P., Garçon and Nicot v. France, App. Nos. 79885/12 52471/13
52596/13, ¶ 129 (April 7, 2017) (“[T]he Court has held that, in the sphere of
medical assistance, even where the refusal to accept a particular treatment might
lead to a fatal outcome, the imposition of medical treatment without the consent
of a mentally competent adult patient would interfere with his or her right to
physical integrity.”) [perma.cc/K93F-NNRN].
137. See id. at ¶ 73 (noting that the Commissioner for Human Rights of the
Council of Europe published an issue paper, “Human rights and gender identity,”
in which he explained that the right not to be sterilized is a basic right and
intrusion should be avoided); see also Transgender-Europe and ILGA-Europe v.
Czech Republic, App. No. 117/2015, ¶ 82 (2018) (“Medical treatment without free
informed consent breaches physical and psychological integrity, and may in
certain cases be injurious to health . . . . Guaranteeing free consent is
fundamental to the enjoyment of the right to health, and is integral to autonomy
and human dignity and the obligation to protect the right to health.”)
[https://perma.cc/YTX3-R2RK].
138. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C
326/02 (recognizing that reproductive privacy rights are guaranteed under the
charter).
139. See Garçon and Nicot, at ¶ 128 (stating that the court did not include
the intellectual hardship in “medical” necessities).
140. See Gwendolyn Albert & Marek Szilvasi, Intersectional Discrimination
of Romani Women Forcibly Sterilized in the Former Czechoslovakia and Czech
Republic, 19 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 23, 26–27 (2017) (noting that pursuant to
the policy, 60 % of sterilizations were performed on Romani women, who
accounted for only 7% of the population).
141. Id. at 23–24 (stating that the first Romani woman began filing lawsuits
in 1995 with varying success).
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or their claims were time-barred.142 The European Court of Human
Rights concluded that when the applicant was left with no option
but to agree to a sterilization, it amounted to the violation of
ECHR’s guarantee of freedom from inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and the protection of private and family
life.143 The court found that the deprivation of meaningful choice
from the applicant constituted a gross disregard for her dignity and
autonomy.144
Freedom from sterilization expands to the right from
inadvertent sterilization. A nurse who suffered a serious
complication after using an abortion medication alleged that her
right of informed consent was violated.145 The ECHR found that
her right to personal life was harmed by the negligent omission of
information about the abortion procedure, even though she was a
medical professional.146

142. Id. at 28–29 (describing that many women did not realize the procedure
they had done until many years later, time-barring their claims against
hospitals).
143. See V.C. v. Slovakia, 2011-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 381 ¶ 106 (“The Court notes
that sterilisation constitutes a major interference with a person’s reproductive
health status. As it concerns one of the essential bodily functions of human beings,
it bears on manifold aspects of the individual’s personal integrity including his or
her physical and mental well-being and emotional, spiritual and family life.”).
144. See id. at ¶¶ 119–20 (noting that the medical staff displayed gross
disregard “for her right to autonomy and choice as a patient” that amounted to a
violation of Article 3 of the Convention).
145. See Csoma v. Romania, App. No. 8759/05, ¶ 27 (Jan. 15, 2013)
[https://perma.cc/6B9E-YV74] (“Relying on Articles 2, 6 and 13 of the Convention,
the applicant complained that she had not been properly informed of the risks of
the procedure and that because of medical negligence her life had been
endangered and she had become permanently unable to bear children.”).
146. See id. at ¶ 68 (stating that “by not involving the applicant in the choice
of medical treatment and by not informing her properly of the risks involved in
the medical procedure, the applicant suffered an infringement of her right to
private life”).
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b. Abortion
A woman’s decision to obtain an abortion is also protected
against legislative interference.147 In 2009, the European
Parliament adopted a Resolution on the Situation of Fundamental
Rights.148 The resolution urged member states to ensure that
women can fully enjoy their reproductive rights, including the
freedom to avoid unsafe abortions.149 It advised against invoking
customs, traditions, or religious considerations to justify
discrimination against women, even if such discrimination had
been authorized in a member state.150 This means that member
states cannot invoke their own cultural tradition or religion to
hinder the basic right to have a safe abortion.
The resolution prevents burdensome abortion regulations,
which have been enacted and enforced, for example, in
Germany.151 Since the Nazi era, the act of having an abortion is a
criminal offense, and the abortion was unpunished only if strict
statutory conditions were satisfied.152 While human dignity is

147. See Berer, supra note 130, at 15–16 (stating that despite foreign
legislatures’ attempts to restrict abortions in their countries, international
human rights bodies are increasingly advocating for safe abortions based on
international human rights standards for women’s reproductive autonomy).
148. Comm. on C.L., Just. and Home Affs., Report on the Situation of
Fundamental Rights in the European Union 2004–2008, (2007/2145 (INI)) (Jan.
14, 2009).
149. See id. at ¶ 61 (emphasizing the need for states to raise awareness of
women’s right to reproductive health which includes freedom of access to
contraception and freedom to avoid high-risk illegal abortions).
150. See id. at ¶ 70 (encouraging Member States “to disallow the invoking of
custom, tradition or any other religious consideration to justify any form of
discrimination, oppression or violence against women or the adoption of policies
which might put their lives in danger”).
151. See Melissa Eddy, A Hitler-Era Abortion Law Haunts Merkel, and
Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018) (explaining that one such law, § 219a of
Germany’s criminal code, makes it illegal for doctors to publicize in any way that
they perform abortions) [perma.cc/3H48-6Z82].
152. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB.] [Penal Code], 1871, as amended, §§ 218, 219
(Ger.) (noting that these provisions date back to 1871, but under the current
statute, § 218a, an abortion is not punished if abortion counseling is offered before
abortion and the operation is performed by a doctor within twelve weeks of
conception).
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central to constitutional liberties,153 the West Germany’s Federal
Constitutional Court held decades ago that the constitutional
protection of fetal life required restrictions on the right to
abortion.154
Shortly after the opinion was issued, negotiations between the
West Germany and East Germany gave rise to a unified abortion
law.155 The law balanced the protection of a fetus with women’s
privacy to a certain degree, and it decriminalized the abortion in
the following circumstances: medical indication (e.g., risk to a
pregnant woman’s life, a disability of a fetus); criminological
indication (e.g., rape); and abortion consultation.156 The
consultation exception has required women to go through state-

153. See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I art. 2(1) (Ger.)
(“Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or the moral law.”) [https://perma.cc/TMP4-RCBF].
154. See BVERFGE 88, 203 (1993) (invalidating a statute that allowed
abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy); see also Edward J. Eberle,
Observations on the Development of Human and Personality in German
Constitutional Law: An Overview, 33 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 201, 209 (2012) (stating
that the Constitutional Court invoked article two of the Basic Law’s ‘‘the right to
life and to physical integrity” clause to justify strict limitations on abortions in
the country); Stephan Jaggi, Revolutionary Reform in German Constitutional
Law, 41 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219 (2018) (explaining that the court
changed the burden of proof and used a balancing test to harmonize a woman’s
right of abortion with a fetal life protection, and transformed the feticide
punishment to abortion counseling); Reve B. Siegel, Dignity and Sexuality:
Claims on Dignity in Transnational Debates over Abortion and Same-sex
Marriage, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 355, 370 (2012) (stressing the meaning of dignity
in US law and German law).
155. See Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Law of Abortion in
Germany: Should Americans Pay Attention?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
1, 15 (1994) (“[T]he Bundestag passed the new all-German abortion statute on
June 26, 1992.”); see also Jeremy Telman, Abortion and Women’s Legal
Personhood in Germany: A Contribution to the Feminist Theory of the State, 24
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 91, 148 (“The new abortion law is a compromise
that reflects the general lack of social consensus in the united Germany.”).
156. See Kommers, supra note 155 at 13–14 (stating that the law declared
abortion as “not illegal” under certain circumstances, but after the twelfth week
of pregnancy, the woman could only abort her fetus to prevent a serious threat to
her life or a grave impairment of her physical or mental health).
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provided abortion consultations and to disclose a reason for
seeking an abortion.157
Notwithstanding the foregoing historically restrictive
environment, German abortion law is expected to change.158 In
2019, the German Criminal Code was amended to narrow the
criminalization of health care providers’ giving of information
about abortions.159 Section 219a (Advertising Abortion) Paragraph
4 allows doctors, hospitals, and other institutions to provide
objective information about the abortion procedures that they may
provide in certain cases allowed under the law.160 Providers may
refer to information on abortions provided by other listed
institutions, such as federal or state agencies, and the German
Medical Association.161 German courts may have an opportunity to
decide on women’s abortion rights if the abortion law is amended
as proposed.162

157. See BVERFGE 88, 203 (citing Basic Law Grundgesetz, art. 2(1) as the
constitutional ground of fetal life protection); see also Kommers, supra note 155
at 14 (“The statute’s counseling provisions . . . directed counselors to stress the
value of unborn life and to encourage women in distress to make a responsible
and conscientious decision.”).
158. Melissa Eddy, Germany Proposes to Ease, Not End, Nazi-Era Abortion
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019) [perma.cc/ZWE8-VXB4].
159. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB.] [Penal Code], 2019, § 219a (Ger.) (stating
that criminal liability “does not apply where physicians or statutorily recognised
counselling agencies provide information about which physicians, hospitals or
facilities are prepared to terminate a pregnancy under the conditions of section
218a (1) to (3)”) [perma.cc/RH63-QMKY]; see generally German Cabinet Backs
Compromise in Abortion Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 6, 2019, 6:24 AM)
[perma.cc/W76L-CVLK].
160. See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB.] [Penal Code], 2019, § 219a(4) (Ger.) (stating
that a penalty of imprisonment “does not apply where doctors, hospitals or
facilities 1) make reference to the fact that they terminate pregnancies under the
conditions of section 218a (1) to (3) or; 2) make reference to information about
terminating a pregnancy provided by the competent federal or Land authority, a
counselling agency in accordance with the Act on Pregnancies in Conflict
Situations or a medical council”) [perma.cc/RH63-QMKY].
161. See Eddy, supra note 158 (stating that “the proposal would task the
German Medical Association, which represents physicians, with compiling and
publishing a list of all doctors and clinics providing abortions, along with
information about which procedures are offered”).
162. See Rachel Loxton, Explained: Germany’s Plans to Change Controversial
Abortion Laws, THE LOCAL DE (Jan. 30, 2019, 4:57 PM) (stating that there is a
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Polish law has one of the strictest sets of abortion regulations
in Europe.163 The Constitutional Court ruled that the abortion is
unconstitutional if performed for social reasons, because fetal life
is not well respected.164 Under the current law, women can obtain
abortions only in the following circumstances: if there is a high
probability of fetal abnormality or serious disease; if the pregnancy
has resulted from a criminal act; and if a pregnant woman’s life or
health is endangered.165
A Polish woman who could not get access to genetic testing or
an abortion because of the absence of procedural framework, filed
a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights.166 The
court held that the failure to allow her timely access to prenatal
genetic testing had amounted to interference with her right to
private life guaranteed by Article 8 of ECHR.167 The obstacles
preventing her from seeking an abortion to protect her own health
were also found to have violated her right to private life.168 With
regard to procedural protection, the court concluded that a
pregnant woman should at least have a procedure to be heard in
strong social movement in Germany pushing for the decriminalization of abortion
laws, along with abolition of Section 219a) [perma.cc/ZH38-G747].
163. See Poland’s Abortion Rules Are Now Among the Strictest in Any Rich
Country, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2020) (describing an October 2020 ruling from
the country’s Constitutional Tribunal which held that women would no longer be
able to justify an abortion based on severe fatal defects) [perma.cc/KKW6-UQT8].
164. See Tysiąc v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03 ¶¶ 36–40, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42 (2007)
[https://perma.cc/P975-NE97] (describing the regulation of abortion in Poland).
165. See Matina Stevis-Gridneff, Alisha Haridasani Gupta, and Monika
Pronzcuk, Coronavirus Created an Obstacle Course for Safe Abortions, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2020), (“Abortion is illegal in most circumstances in Poland, and so for
years, many women have traveled within Europe to seek the procedure.”)
[perma.cc/Q68W-UXEN].
166. R.R. v. Poland, App. No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 828 (2011)
[https://perma.cc/5L4X-FHN3].
167. See id. at ¶ 211 (“[I]t cannot . . . be said that . . . the Polish State
complied with its positive obligations to safeguard the applicant’s right to respect
for her private life in the context of controversy over whether she should have had
access to, firstly, prenatal genetic tests and subsequently, an abortion, had the
applicant chosen this option for her.”).
168. See id. at ¶¶ 192–214 (stating that the Polish Government’s alleged
procedures were neither effective nor accessible and based on the factual
circumstances, the Court concluded that the applicant was denied effective
respect for her private life).
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person and receive a written reasoned decision by a competent
authority.169 The application of strict scrutiny was suggested given
that core of privacy rights under Article 8 of ECHR was at issue.170
Restrictions not falling within a woman’s core freedom to
make an abortion decision are subject to a balancing test.171 In A,
B and C v. Ireland,172 the European Court of Human Rights, sitting
in Grand Chamber, held that Ireland’s restrictions on abortion
violated the plaintiff’s fundamental rights after she was required
to travel to England to obtain an abortion when she felt her
pregnancy, in combination with her cancer, posed a significant
health risk.173 The court, stating that Article 8 of ECHR
encompasses the right to personal autonomy and to physical and
psychological integrity, held that the plaintiff’s right to family life
and private life was violated when she could not establish her
eligibility for a lawful abortion in Ireland.174 Yet, as to plaintiffs
seeking an abortion for their well-being and health,175 the court
asked whether the aim was justifiable and whether the restriction
amounted to a disproportionate interference with the plaintiffs’
169. See Tysiąc v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, ¶ 117, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42 (2007)
(stating that measures affecting fundamental human rights, should be subject to
such procedures before an independent body that should also guarantee pregnant
women “at least the possibility to be heard in person and have her views
considered” and a written decision issued by the competent body)
[https://perma.cc/P975-NE97].
170. See id. at ¶¶ 83–84 (describing applicant’s argument that the lack of
scrutiny of the State’s decision and lack of adequate procedures for redress in her
case failed to respect her privacy and bodily integrity).
171. See A, B and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, ¶ 229, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2032
(2010) (“[T]he Court must examine whether there existed a pressing social need
for the measure in question and, in particular, whether the interference was
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/VRZ8-3LS4].
172. See id. at ¶ 263 (holding that third applicant’s Article 8 rights had been
violated when “neither the medical consultation nor litigation options relied on
by the Government constituted effective and accessible procedures which allowed
the third applicant to establish her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland”).
173. See id. at ¶¶ 247–268.
174. See id. at ¶ 242 (noting that the court recognized reproductive
“autonomy” as well as bodily integrity in privacy right).
175. See id. ¶ 125 (detailing that the first applicant submitted her history of
alcoholism, post–natal depression, and difficult family circumstances in seeking
an abortion abroad and the second applicant acknowledged that she travelled for
an abortion as she was not ready to have a child).
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rights.176 While the protection of fetal life was held to be a
legitimate aim, the court proceeded to examine whether the
restrictions at issue were proportionate to the state’s purpose.177
Ultimately, Irish citizens voted to repeal the abortion
prohibition in a May 2018 referendum.178 To the disappointment of
the voters, however, the current Irish law permits abortions only
until the twelfth week of gestation, which is a very short timeframe
in which a woman may seek an abortion.179
c. Summary
In conclusion, the European decisions concerning reproductive
privacy show that courts begin their analyses by characterizing the
restricted freedom and then applying a different level of scrutiny
depending on whether the freedom falls within the “core” of privacy
rights under Article 8 of the ECHR.180 Courts apply stricter
standards to restrictions of the freedom that is central to private
life.181 Disproportionately broad regulations have been struck

176. See id. ¶¶ 219–42 (explaining that the court examined whether the
interference was “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic
society” for one of the “legitimate aims” of Art. 8 of the ECHR).
177. See Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 29 Oct. 1992, 15 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 244 (1993) (describing that although states are given a wide margin of
appreciation in this area, it noted that this margin is not unlimited and that a
state’s discretion in the field of morals is not absolute); Id. ¶ 232.
Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at
stake, the margin allowed to the State will normally be restricted . . . Where,
however, there is no consensus within the member States of the Council of
Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the
best means of protecting it, particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or
ethical issues, the margin will be wider.
178. Caelainn Hogan, Why Ireland’s Battle Over Abortion is Far From Over,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LV3MAL2E].
179. See id. (explaining patients can only access a free and legal abortion if
their pregnancy is no more than twelve weeks).
180. See Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights;
Right to Respect for Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence, EUR. CT.
OF HUM. RTS., ¶¶ 107, 110 (2020).
181. See id. at 73 (“[S]tricter scrutiny is called for as regards any further
limitations, such as restrictions placed by those authorities on parental rights of
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down, because they violate a pregnant woman’s right to private
life, as well as her right to psychological and bodily integrity.182
Decriminalization and downregulation is the mainstay in
European countries.183
In other words, a European government’s restriction on
freedom stemming from compulsory sterilization is presumptively
impermissible, because the freedom to have a child is at the core of
one’s private life, and is therefore given heightened protection.184
A right to abortion is protected, but it is subject to competing state
interests in protecting fetal life and maternal health, as well as
maintaining socially accepted morals.185 The extent of restrictions
on a woman’s freedom is weighed against governmental interests
under a balancing test when abortions are sought for the woman’s
well-being or her life planning.186 In such cases, the government
must establish that there is a legitimate interest and that the
methods used are necessary and proportional.187 Whereas, if a
right to safe abortions, or a “core” freedom of privacy, is restricted,
courts apply stricter standard and generally invalidate the law.188
2. Canadian Law
While Canada is one of the common law countries, a stark
difference has emerged between Canadian law and British law
access, and as regards any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective
protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life.”).
182. See R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 828 (2011) ¶¶ 192–214;
Tysiąc v. Poland, No. 5410/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 42 (2007) ¶¶ 116–124 (describing
differing reasons overly broad regulations have been found unconstitutional).
183. See A, B and C v. Ireland, No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) ¶ 175
(finding European consensus including the abortion legalization during the first
trimester in 31 out of 47 member states); Berer, supra note 130, at 21–22.
184. A, B and C, No. 25579/05 at ¶¶ 107, 110.
185. See id. at ¶ 213 (“The woman’s right to respect for her private life must
be weighed against other competing rights and freedoms invoked including those
of the unborn child.”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at ¶ 231.
188. See id. at ¶ 232 (“Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s
existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will normally be
restricted.”).
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where abortion
concerned.189

rights

and

compulsory

sterilizations

are

a. Unconsented Sterilization
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the nontherapeutic sterilization of a woman with intellectual difficulty
was impermissible, even upon the request of her parent, because
the sterilization violated her basic rights.190 The court rejected the
English “best interest” approach on the ground that it would be
extremely difficult or even impossible to decide what an affected
person’s best interest would be.191
b. Abortion
The right to abortion receives robust protection.192 Canada’s
criminalization of abortion ended in 1984.193 Moreover, R v.
Morgentaler194 invalidated the criminalization of abortion on the
ground that forcing a woman, by threat of criminal sanction, to
carry a fetus to term is a profound interference with a woman’s
189. See R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 63 O.R. (2d) 281 (Can. Ont.);
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, 490, 107 D.L.R. 4th 537 (Can.) (finding the abortion provision
in the Criminal Code to be unconstitutional); see also Berer, supra note 130, at 16
(detailing reasons abortions had previously been criminalized or regulated).
190. See E. (Mrs.) v. Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388, ¶ 86 (Can.) (illustrating that
therapeutic sterilization is defined to mean a sterilizing procedure performed for
treating physical or mental conditions, therefore the operation would not serve
any benefits to the women).
191. See Re F, [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 55 (explaining why the “best interest” approach
was rejected).
192. See Maham Abedi, How Abortion Rights Work in Canada — and Whether
They Could Be Put at Risk, GLOBAL NEWS (May 24, 2019) (“Canada has a strong
history since 1988 of shutting any attempt to reopen the abortion debate in
Parliament.”) [https://perma.cc/AZR3-B3BT].
193. History of Abortion in Canada, NAT’L ABORTION FEDERATION, (last visited
Aug. 26, 2020) (giving a history of the Canada Health Act 1984 and how it
legalized abortions the government funds are available for certain services)
[https://perma.cc/45SZ-YCKL].
194. R v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 63 O.R. (2d) 281 (Can. Ont.); [1993]
3 S.C.R. 463, 490, 107 D.L.R. 4th 537 (Can.).
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body and thus a violation of the security of her person.195 Justice
Wilson concluded that a woman’s decision to terminate her
pregnancy is a freedom protected from government interference as
part of a democratic society.196
c. Summary
In Canada, strict scrutiny is applied in cases involving
nonconsensual sterilization.197 Also, based on R v. Morgentaler’s
broad prohibition of abortion bans, any interference with a
woman’s freedom to receive an abortion is presumably
unconstitutional, unless proven otherwise.198
3. English Law
a. Unconsented Sterilization
The United Kingdom never enacted a eugenics sterilization
statute, even though nonconsensual sterilization operations have
been performed.199 An application for a compulsory sterilization
procedure for non-therapeutic purposes has been approved when
the procedure would serve the best interests of the patient.200
195. See id. (showing that the minority in Morgentaler indicated that less
rigorous scrutiny should apply).
196. See id. at 105 (stating that the psychological trauma that a pregnant
woman suffers shows that the procedure violates the security of her person);
Joanna N. Erdman, Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights in Canada, 49 OTTAWA
L. REV. 221, 245 (2018) (indicating the importance of a woman’s autonomy and
importance in society).
197. See Re Eve, [1986] 31 D.L.R. (4th) 1,14 (Can.) (describing the standard
for determining the constitutionality of unconsented sterilization in Canada).
198. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 63 O.R. (2d) 281 (Can.).
199. See Stansfield et al., The Sterilization of People with Intellectual
Disabilities in England and Wales During the Period 1988 to 1999, 51 J. INTELL.
DISABILITY RES. 569, 570 (2007) (discussing that some courts have hesitated to
apply best interest standard because there is not enough guidance).
200. See Re F, [1990] 2 A.C. 1, 55 (explaining that there exist circumstances
that should allow treatment be given to a patient without consent if in the best
interests of the patient).
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This English approach has been criticized as vulnerable to a
decision-maker’s subjective perspective in attempting to ascertain
a patient’s “best interest.”201 According to one report, in thirty-nine
sterilization applications from 1988 to 1999, courts ruled that the
procedure was in the person’s best interest in thirty-one cases,
even though almost all were made on behalf of persons with
intellectual difficulties.202 This data suggests individuals with
intellectual difficulties in the United Kingdom are at serious risk
of being deprived of their reproductive freedom.203
b. Abortion
In Britain and its former colonies, abortion was criminalized
by the Offences against the Person Act of 1861.204 There are
exceptions to the ban, such as when an abortion will save a
woman’s life or when it may help a woman’s physical or mental
health.205 As set forth in the Abortion Act of 1967, abortions are
permitted, up to a period of twenty-four weeks, only if continuing
the pregnancy would involve a greater risk to the woman’s physical
or mental health than what would exist if the pregnancy were to
be terminated.206 Abortions after twenty-four weeks are also
permissible, where the health of a pregnant woman is severely at
risk.207 In essence, clinicians in the United Kingdom are free to
exercise their own good faith judgments when faced with
justifiable social concerns.208
201. See Stansfield, supra note 199, at 570 (discussing that some courts have
hesitated to apply best interest standard because there is not enough guidance).
202. See id. (explaining the statistical study of forced sterilization).
203. See id. (“Referrals for sterilization are almost always for people with
IDs.”).
204. See Andrew Grubb, Abortion Law in England: The Medicalization of a
Crime, 18 LAW MED. HEALTH CARE 146, 148 (1990) (detailing how abortion was
criminalized by the Offences against the Person Act of 1861).
205. See generally R v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687 (detailing exceptions to the
Offences Against the Person Act).
206. The Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, § 1(1)(d) (Eng.).
207. Id.
208. Amelia Hill, MPs Bring Bill to Ban Late Abortions for Cleft Lip, Cleft
Palate and Clubfoot, THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2020) (explaining that § 1(2) of the
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c. Summary
In short, the United Kingdom allows nonconsensual
sterilization procedures when it is in the best interests of the
patient, although the best interest test is a standard difficult to
apply.209 Additionally, while abortion is criminalized, it is
generally available for women through statutory exceptions.
4. Japanese Law
a. Unconsented Sterilization
Japan enforced a statute allowing the sterilization of people
with intellectual difficulties from 1948 to 1996.210 Civil rights
actions were filed by sterilized women, who alleged that their
reproductive rights had been violated.211 The women further
argued that their freedom of reproduction was constitutionally
protected as a part of their right to pursue happiness, under Article
13 of the constitution.212 Sendai Chihō Saibansho, the district
court, stated that the right to procreate was constitutionally
protected.213 While the court’s did not clearly describe the standard
it applied, it nevertheless concluded that forced sterilization was a

Abortion Act allows a doctor to take into account the patient’s actual or
reasonably foreseeable environment in making a decision to terminate the
pregnancy, increasing the frequency of abortions that are performed)
[https://perma.cc/M9GZ-YYGV].
209. See Doug Pet, Forced Sterilization Considered in a UK Court,
BIOPOLITICAL TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), (explaining the court’s determination of when
forced sterilization is appropriate) [https://perma.cc/X4Y2-J88Y].
210. See Mari Yamaguchi, Victims Begin to Talk About Japan’s Sterilization
Program, AP NEWS (Dec. 18, 1997), (explaining that many people were forcibly
sterilized under the eugenics law) [https://perma.cc/YB54-W8FE].
211. Sendai Chihō Saibansho [Sendai Dist. Ct.] May 28, 2019, Hei 1 (wa) no.
76 HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 1461, 153 (Japan).
212. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 27, 2001, Hei 15 (o) no. 576, 55 SAIKŌ
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSYŪ] 1154 (Japan) (explaining how the
Supreme Court of Japan has not decided on a right to privacy).
213. Sendai Chihō Saibansho,HANREI TAIMUZU [HANTA] 1461, 153.
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significant constitutional violation.214 In related cases, Japanese
courts have continued to hold that nonconsensual sterilization
procedures are unconstitutional.215
b. Abortion
It is a criminal offence in Japan to either receive an abortion
or to perform an abortion without a special medical license.216 The
Japanese regulation permits licensed doctors to conduct abortions
within twenty-two weeks of pregnancy where there are medical or
economic grounds.217 This statutory safe harbor has been liberally
interpreted in practice.218 As a result, more than 150,000 abortions
were performed, with only twelve detected violations and no court
proceedings, between 2014 and 2017.219 The economic hardship
exception covers situations in which the pregnant women is a
bread earner and cannot both work and raise a child.220

214. See id. (detailing that the court refused to afford monetary compensation
to plaintiffs on statute of limitations grounds).
215. E.g., Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] June 30, 2020, Hei 2 (wa)
no. __ HANTA ___, ___ (Japan).
216. See KEIHŌ (PEN. C.) art. 212, 214 (explaining that a practitioner may
obtain a license from a regional licensing authority, which is comprised of
professional obstetricians); see also Please Tell Me About Abortion, JAPAN
ASSOCIATION OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, (recommending abortion
performed earlier than twenty-two weeks for the lower risk to a patient’s health
and the lower medical costs) [https://perma.cc/9U85-9EW8].
217. See id. (offering questions and answers regarding the Maternal Health
Act, including the twenty-two week provision); Botaihogohō [Maternal Protection
Act], Law No. 156 of 1948, art. 14 (Japan) (establishing the twenty-two week
provision).
218. See Criminal Prosecution Statistics, MINISTRY OF JUST. (providing raw
data showing extremely low prosecution rates under the Maternal Health Act)
[https://perma.cc/Q2AK-QJKL].
219. See id. (gathering annualized prosecution data for the Maternal Health
Act); Report on Public Health Administration and Services FY2018, Abortion
Statistics, MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOR, AND WELFARE (providing data on the
Maternal Protection Act and highlighting that 161,741 legal abortions took place
in fiscal year 2018) [https://perma.cc/C393-32JG].
220. See Ryoichiro Miyazaki, A Standard for Medical Care and Clinical
Practice 59 JAPANESE OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY J. N-18 (2007) (acknowledging
that the economic exception hardship would be impossible for doctors to define
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c. Summary
In sum, the Japanese constitution protects an individual’s
freedom from compulsive sterilization because of an intellectual
difficulty.221 Abortion is not tightly restricted nationwide because
there are various socioeconomic grounds for permitting an abortion
procedure. The grounds for providing an abortion procedure are
liberally applied by Japanese courts.222
5. The Republic of Korea and Reproductive Privacy
a. Unconsented Sterilization
In terms of the right to procreate, Korea’s compulsory
sterilization regime was abolished on the ground of privacy
protection.223 Korea has revised provisions in the Mother and Child
Health Act of 1973 (“MCHA”) to terminate the compulsory
sterilization of intellectually challenged people.224

and apply and laying out conditions that meet the economic exception
accordingly) [https://perma.cc/9V6K-PWJX].
221. See Botaihogohō [Maternal Protection Act], Law No. 156 of 1948, art. 14
(Japan) (terminating the National Eugenical Act, Act No. 107 of 1940).
222. MINISTRY OF JUST., supra note 218 (providing raw data showing
extremely low prosecution rates under the Maternal Health Act).
223. See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Apr. 11, 2019, 2017Hun-MaBa127 (S.
Kor.), translated in Constitutional Court of Korea’s online database (explaining
that “the right to self-determination includes the right of a woman to freely create
her own private sphere of life based on her own dignified right to personality, and
the right of a pregnant woman to determine whether to continue her pregnancy
is included in such right . . . ”) [https://perma.cc/CW66-R3CA].
224. See Mother and Child Health Act of 1999 art. 15 (S. Kor.), translated in
Korean Legislation Research Institute’s online database, (deleting the
sterilization provision of the MCHA); See also Ki-Hyun Hahm & Ilhak Lee,
Biomedical Ethics Policy in Korea: Characteristics and Historical Development,
27 J. KOREAN MED. SCI., S76, S76–S81 (May 18, 2012) (“The act was revised to
eliminate eugenic provisions . . . ”) [https://perma.cc/BHX5-2KUM].
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b. Abortion

Abortion has been a criminal act in Korea, although there
have been exceptions for therapeutic abortions.225 Article 14 of the
MCHA permits abortions under the following limited
circumstances: the existence of hereditary diseases; specified
infections; rape or quasi-rape; incest; and a danger to maternal
health.226
Even so, abortions performed before fetal viability were not
excluded from criminal liability, and a woman’s freedom to
terminate her pregnancy was limited even in circumstances where
there was no protectable fetal life under Article 14.227 In 2019, the
Korean Constitutional Court held that a woman has a
fundamental right of self-determination about her pregnancy.228
The court ruled that the broad prohibition of abortion excessively
limited a woman’s right under the principle of balance.229

225. See Criminal Act art. 269–270 (S. Kor.), translated in Korean
Legislation
Research
Institute’s
online
database,
https://law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engMain.do (search required) (outlawing procuring
and providing abortions).
226. See Mother and Child Health Act of 2020 art. 14. (S. Kor.), translated in
Korean
Legislation
Research
Institute’s
online
database,
https://law.go.kr/LSW/eng/engMain.do (search required) (listing the exclusive
exceptions for induced abortion operations).
227. See id. (lacking language excepting abortions before viability performed
for any reason from criminal liability).
228. See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Apr. 11, 2019, 2017Hun-Ma127 (S.
Kor.), translated in Constitutional Court of Korea’s online database (explaining
that the self-abortion restrictions of MHCA violates rules “against excessive
restriction, as well as a pregnant woman’s right to self-determination, right to
health, right to bodily integrity, right to protection of motherhood, and right to
equality”) [https://perma.cc/CW66-R3CA].
229. See id. (concluding that the legislature improperly balanced the public
interest in a fetus’s life and the private interest in preserving a woman’s right to
self-determination, incorrectly giving unilateral priority to the public interest in
the fetal life); See also Joyce Lee & Josh Smith, South Korea court strikes down
abortion law in landmark ruling, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2019), (summarizing the
Court’s holding and explaining that the ban unconstitutionally curbed women’s
rights) [https://perma.cc/P77R-W5YE].
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c. Summary
Korea has seen remarkable developments in reproductive
privacy.230 The Korean Constitutional Court confirmed
constitutional protections for reproductive privacy, and it has
applied a type of a balancing test in determining the
constitutionality of abortion prohibitions.231
6. Privacy Protection in Countries in the Global South
Serious privacy violations have been reported from the Global
South, which have drawn immediate backlash from international
organizations.232 For instance, upon the discovery of widespread
involuntarily sterilizations of HIV-positive women in Namibia, the
United Nations and various human rights groups worked to end
the practice.233

230. See Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Apr. 11, 2019, 2017Hun-Ma127 (S.
Kor.), translated in Constitutional Court of Korea’s online database (explaining
that the self-abortion restrictions of MHCA violates rules “against excessive
restriction, as well as a pregnant woman’s right to self-determination, right to
health, right to bodily integrity, right to protection of motherhood, and right to
equality”) [https://perma.cc/CW66-R3CA].
231. See id. (defining the right to self-determination in terms of freedom in
one’s private sphere of life and weighing that private interest right more heavily
than the public interest motivating the law at issue).
232. See Berer, supra note 130, at 15–16 (describing an increase of
recognition in the Global South that preventing unsafe abortions is paramount to
public health progress and noting the organizations that support a similar view
on progressive abortion law reform).
233. See Pooja Nair, Recent Development: Litigating against the Forced
Sterilization of HIV-Positive Women: Recent Developments in Chile and Namibia,
23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 223, 229–31 (2010) (summarizing patient experiences with
forced sterilization, the coercive tactics they experienced, and the efforts of groups
like the International Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDs and the Legal
Aid Centre); Lucile Scott, Forced Sterilization and Abortion: A Global Human
Rights Problem, THE FOUND. FOR AIDS RSCH. (noting that the exposure from cases
like Namibia spur awareness and United Nations agencies educate the public on
vulnerable populations) [https://perma.cc/K7F4-6KQS].
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a. Unconsented Sterilization

Namibia’s Supreme Court held that HIV-positive women were
involuntarily sterilized where they had signed consent forms while
in labor without fully understanding the consequences of such an
action.234
In 2016, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that
Bolivia’s nonconsensual sterilization of a woman, immediately
after she had given birth, constituted a violation of the woman’s
privacy rights.235 Similarly, the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights recently issued a statement asserting that
involuntary sterilization is an act of sexual or gender-based
violence that may amount to torture or inhumane treatment.236
Both opinions make it clear that forced sterilizations violate
universal protections for human dignity and autonomy.237
b. Abortion
In countries such as South Africa, the right to an abortion has
been enumerated as a constitutional right.238 The preamble to

234. See Gov’t of the Republic of Namib. v. LM, (SA 49/2012) [2014] NASC 19
(Namib.) (stressing the absence on informed consent).
235. See I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, ¶ 153 (Nov. 30, 2016) (“[T]he
decision of whether or not to become a mother or father belongs to the sphere of
the autonomous decisions of the individual in relation to his or her private and
family life.”); IACTHR Holds Bolivia Responsible for Forced Sterilization in
Landmark Judgment, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 3, 2017)
(reporting on the decision, explaining its scope and relationship to various rights,
including privacy) [https://perma.cc/M5L2-B5A8].
236. AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENT NO. 4
ON THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO REDRESS
FOR VICTIMS OF TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING PUNISHMENT
OR TREATMENT (ARTICLE 5) 17 (2017) (“These include physical and psychological
acts committed against victims without their consent or under coercive
circumstances, such as . . . denial of reproductive rights including forced or
coerced pregnancy, abortion and sterilization . . . .”) (emphasis added)
[https://perma.cc/6HBN-7VBX].
237. See supra notes 235–236 and accompanying text.
238. Reva B. Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Abortion, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057, 1072 (Michel Rosenfeld
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South Africa’s abortion statue declares “that it vindicates the
values of human dignity, the achievement of equality, security of
the person, non-racialism and non-sexism, and the advancement
of human rights and freedoms which underlie a democratic South
Africa.”239 The preamble to the Mexico City’s statute legalizing
abortions includes a similar provision.240
The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has
declared that a woman’s freedom to have a safe and legal abortion
is a human right.241 South American courts have similarly
endorsed protections for abortion access under their constitutions
and have also struck down abortion bans.242
c. Summary
The opinions from the Global South stress the importance of
reproductive freedom to secure dignity and autonomy.243 The right
to reproduce and the right to abortion are declared to be basic
& András Sajó eds., 2012) (explaining that the South African statute allowing
abortion within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy has a preamble introducing the
statute in terms of constitutional rights and freedoms valued by the South Africa’s
democracy).
239. Id.
240. See id. at 1072–73 (emphasizing individual rights to decide the number
and spacing of children).
241. See AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, GENERAL COMMENT
NO. 2 ON ARTICLE 14.1 (A), (B), (C) AND (F) AND ARTICLE 14. 2 (A) AND (C) OF THE
PROTOCOL TO THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE
RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA 1, 11–13 (2014) (explaining the general obligations
of the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the women’s rights, specifically
their sexual and reproductive rights).
242. See Berer, supra note 130, at 19–20 (citing P. Bergallo & A. Ramo
Michael, Constitutional developments in Latin American abortion law, 135 INT’L
J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 228 (2016)) (listing places in Latin America where
higher courts have aided in securing abortion rights or at least interpreting the
constitutionality and defining the grounds for abortion).
243. See I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, ¶ 153 (Nov. 30, 2016) (“The
IACtHR’s judgment expands the Court’s jurisprudence . . . the (infrequently
cited) right to dignity under the American Convention on Human Rights . . . .”);
AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 8 (“The right to
dignity enshrines the freedom to make personal decisions without interference
from the State or non-State actors.”).
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human rights without regard to surrounding religious-cultural
environments or dominant political views.244
6. The International Movements Against Coerced Sterilization
and Abortion Restrictions
a. Unconsented Sterilization
The United Nations and the World Health Organization
(“WHO”), as well as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
view involuntary sterilization as a human rights violation.245 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)
prohibits torture, as well as cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment and punishment.246 It also provides that all persons,
even those imprisoned, shall be treated with humanity and with
respect indicative of the inherent dignity of a person.247
Compulsory sterilization falls within the meaning of “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” and deprives
individuals the “dignity of the human person,” as prohibited by the
ICCPR.248
Lawmakers have attempted to justify the sterilization of
intellectually challenged people on the ground that sterilization

244. See AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS, supra note 241, at 9
(“Administrative laws, policies and procedures of health systems and structures
cannot restrict access to family planning/contraception on the basis of religious
beliefs.”).
245. See I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, ¶ 176 (Nov. 30, 2016)
(reviewing these organizations’ positions on consent, emphasizing its prior
nature).
246. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. 95-20 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976),
(following from the “inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family”).
247. See id. arts. 7, 10 (defining basic rights for those imprisoned while
accused, including separation from convicted populations and separation and
priority for the accused who are juveniles).
248. See id. (highlighting the proposition that compulsory sterilization falls
within the meaning under the ICCPR).
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benefits those who have limited vocational skills or a decreased
understanding of their social settings.249 However, this logic has
been rejected under the ICCPR.250 The United Nations prohibits
discrimination against intellectually challenged people,251 and it
also forbids the forced sterilization as a form of treatment.252 The
United Nations has issued an interagency statement establishing
that involuntary sterilization is a violation of fundamental human
rights, including the right to health, the right to privacy, and the
right to be free from discrimination.253 Also, the United Nations
has explained that every person with a disability has a right to
have his or her physical and mental integrity respected on an equal
basis with others, and the individual must be involved in any
decisions affecting them.254

249. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 2017 (1927) (noting that “it is better for
all the world . . . if society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind[,]” in denying the due process and equal protection claims
of a woman involuntarily sterilized by the state of Virginia for her feeble mind).
250. See Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram, International Human
Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469, 487
(2002) (controverting such justification by noting “that the lack of economic
resources in any country is not a reason to limit any of the rights conventions or
standards”).
251. See id. at 472 (specifying that “people with mental disabilities are
protected by human rights law by virtue of their basic humanity”).
252. See G.A. Res. 46/119, Principles for the Protection of Persons with
Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (Dec. 17, 1991)
(specifying that sterilization shall not be carried out as a treatment for mental
conditions).
253. See Eliminating Forced, Coercive and Otherwise Involuntary
Sterilization: an interagency statement, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1,
1 (2014), (reiterating the anti-involuntary sterilization position of the OHCHR,
UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and WHO and highlighting the
contours of their condemnation) [https://perma.cc/68J3-H4WF].
254. See Peter Bartlett, United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Mental Health Law, 75 MODERN L. REV. 752, 755, 765 (2012)
(differentiating the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
Mental Health Law from prior articulations of rights of persons with disabilities).
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b. Abortion

Regarding the abortion, strict regulations are disfavored
because of their connection with poor gynecological outcomes.255 A
number of studies have identified a correlation between abortion
bans and a higher mortality rate due to unsafe abortion
procedures.256 On the other hand, the legalization of abortion leads
to safer operations, and improves women’s health.257 Therefore, the
United Nations and the WHO have issued statements supporting
less restrictive national systems.258
The UN Human Rights Committee ruled that Ireland’s
criminalization of abortion and failure to provide public health
services violated Article 7 (right to be free from cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment), Article 17 (right to privacy), and Article 26
(right to equality before the law) of the ICCPR.259 The committee
found that Ireland’s denial of abortion access through
criminalization forced women to face a range of psychological,
physical, and financial burdens and to experience fear, stigma,
isolation, and abandonment.260 The committee adopted a balancing
255. See Marge Berer, National Laws and Unsafe Abortion: The Parameters
of Change, 12 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 1, 2–3 (2004) (showing that the
prevalence of unsafe abortions remains the highest in the 82 countries with the
narrowest legal grounds for obtaining abortions, while the 52 countries that allow
abortion on request have a median unsafe abortion rate as low as two per 1000
women of reproductive age).
256. See David A. Grimes, Janie Benson, Susheela Singh, Mariana Romero,
Bela Ganatra, Friday E. Okonofua & Iqbal H. Shah, Unsafe abortion: the
preventable pandemic, 368 THE LANCET 1908, 1912 (2006) (“[U]nsafe abortion and
related mortality are both highest in countries with narrow grounds for legal
abortion.” (citing Berer, supra note 255, at 1–8)).
257. See Grimes, et al., supra note 256, at 1915 (finding statistics from other
countries showing that legalization of abortion leads to safer operations).
258. See Brooke R. Johnson, Vinod Mishra, Antonella Francheska Lavelanet,
Rajat Khosla, & Bela Ganatra, A Global Database of Abortion Laws, Policies,
Health Standards and Guidelines, 95 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGAN. 542, 542
(June 9, 2017) (reporting unsafe abortions are “more than four times higher in
countries with more restrictive abortion laws”) [https://perma.cc/425U-S99B].
259. See generally, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Whelan v. Ireland, Commc’n
No.
2425/2014,
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014
(2017)
[https://perma.cc/M7TP-RQ2M].
260. See id. at 6.1–10 (finding psychological, physical and financial burdens
caused by abortion’s criminalization).

REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY IN THE WORLD

149

test similar to that in A, B and C v. Ireland,261 and it concluded
that the restrictions could not be justified.262
c. Summary
Members of the United Nations must abolish compulsory
sterilization of intellectually challenged people and are urged to
decriminalize abortion where a fetus is not viable.263 The
suggestions are underpinned by the fundamental nature of a right
to health and privacy.264
7. Summary
The foregoing developments around the world elucidate the
recognition of fundamental privacy rights covering both the
freedom from nonconsensual sterilization and the freedom to seek
a safe abortion.265 The recent decisions from the European Court
of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada, the Korean
261. See generally, Case of A, B, and C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05
(December 16, 2010) [https://perma.cc/Z4ER-9EQX].
262. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mellet v. Ireland, Commc’n No.
2324/2013, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (2016) (deciding the legislation
was too restrictive).
263. See Sterilization of Women and Girls with Disabilities: A Briefing Paper,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 10, 2011, 5:47PM) (describing the background of forced
sterilization of females with disabilities and summarizing various international
law and recommendations) [https://perma.cc/5LU7-YHDT]; see also United
Nations Human Rights Committee Defends Women and Girls’ Right to Life, INT’L
WOMEN’S HEALTH COAL. (Nov. 30, 2018) (summarizing the 2018 Human Rights
Committee joint statement by the Commission on the Rights of People with
Disabilities
and
Elimination
of
Discrimination
against
Women)
[https://perma.cc/ET9G-L3MB].
264. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 263 (finding the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights stated a forced sterilization on females
with disabilities violates the Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights); INT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH COAL., supra note 263 (reporting undue
restriction an infringement upon an individual’s right to privacy).
265. See UN Human Rights Committee Asserts that Access to Abortion and
Prevention of Maternal Mortality are Human Rights, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Oct.
31, 2018) (putting “women’s health and bodily autonomy at the top of human
rights conversations”) [https://perma.cc/B9TZ-2E9U].
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Constitutional Court, the UN Human Rights Committee, and the
Japanese district courts regarding involuntary sterilization
support the consensus that people, even if intellectually
challenged, have a fundamental right to make procreative choices
and abortion decisions, both of which are essential to their dignity
and autonomy.266
C. General Acceptance of Strict Scrutiny
If sterilization procedures are requested for a person with an
intellectual disability, judicial review must be available.267 Except
for a compelling necessity that may not be satisfied by any other
means, forced sterilizations violate a fundamental right of
procreation.268 As this Article discusses, a right to abortion is
increasingly and predominantly recognized as a basic human
right, and the United Nations and the WHO have urged nations to
reconsider their strict abortion regulations.269
As such, an international consensus has developed that the
freedom from compulsory sterilization is a protected fundamental
right.270 Foreign courts have invalidated sterilization statutes
under a standard equivalent to strict scrutiny.271 Courts in the
United States also employ strict approaches in analyzing
compulsory sterilization cases.272 The heavy burden of proof falls
266. See supra Part III.B.1 (covering European Court of Human Rights), Part
III.B.2 (covering Canadian law), Part III.B.4 (covering Japanese law), Part III.B.5
(covering South Korean law).
267. See supra Part III.B.1 (covering Britain) and Part III.B.2 (covering
Canada).
268. See Eliminating Forced, Coercive and Otherwise Involuntary
Sterilization – An Interagency Statement, WHO, 1 (“[s]terilization without full,
free and informed consent” violates numerous human rights, including the right
to “found a family”) [https://perma.cc/FKS2-9PB4].
269. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 265 (highlighting how
comprehensive abortion services are necessary to guarantee the right to life,
health, privacy, and non-discrimination for women and girls).
270. See supra Part III.A (discussing reproductive privacy in the United
States).
271. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing abortion in relation to European Law).
272. See supra Part III.A (discussing the recent abortion cases and the fetal
remains case have been decided under a balancing test, considering the protection
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on the government to demonstrate that the restrictions are
necessary for a compelling state interest, and an irreversible
measure is only available as a last resort to resolve significant
difficulties of affected individuals.273 Thus, a compulsory
sterilization cannot be performed merely because an individual is
intellectually challenged, suspectedly promiscuous, or dependent
on other family members.274
The right to abortion has also been regarded as a fundamental
right.275 Decriminalization movements have spread the globe, and
restrictions on abortions have been lifted.276 The European Union
and the United Nations have warned about the collateral
consequences of strict abortion regulations, including the
increased prevalence of unsafe abortions and the stigmatization of
women who have experienced an abortion.277
The Supreme Court of Canada held that state interference
into a woman’s decision to terminate their pregnancy was
unconstitutional.278 Similarly, the Korean Constitutional Court,
the UN Human Rights Committee, and the European Court of
Human Rights have all seemingly agreed that the core of women’s
abortion decisions, which generally includes the access to safe
of the health and well-being of a fetus, public morals over the use of not viable
human tissues).
273. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–43 (1942) (finding
compulsory sterilization is reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis).
274. See id. (deciding to sterilize an individual just on the basis of an
intellectual disability does not pass through a strict scrutiny analysis).
275. See Johanna B. Fine, Katherine Mayall, & Lilian Sepúlveda, The Role of
International Human Rights Norms in the Liberalization of Abortion Laws
Globally, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (June 2, 2017) (finding judicial and legislative
evolutions regarding rights to abortions are creating a stronger protection to
determine
abortion
rights
are
fundamental
human
rights)
[https://perma.cc/MWW2-W89V].
276. See e.g., Patrick J. McDonnell & Kate Linthicum, Across Latin America,
Abortion Restrictions are Being Loosened, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013) (reporting
abortion has been decriminalized in cases of sexual assault showing restrictions
have lifted) [https://perma.cc/ZLK4-2YZD].
277. See “Unsafe Abortion is Still Killing Tens of Thousands Women Around
the World” – UN Rights Experts Warn, WHO (Sept. 28, 2016) (discussing the
consequences of criminalized abortions) [https://perma.cc/N83Z-DEKC].
278. See R. v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 90 (Can.) (invalidating
criminalized abortions).
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abortion or the access to abortion before fetal viability, constitutes
a basic human right.279 This reasoning was notably apparent in the
European Court of Human Rights decision finding Ireland’s
abortion ban to be an impermissible infringement of the core of a
woman’s right to privacy.280
Numerous state courts continuously evaluate abortion
restrictions under strict scrutiny.281 The majority of courts
examine the legislative process and check whether the restriction
is well-suited and the least restrictive means to achieve the
compelling state interest.282 A minority of courts accept Casey’s
undue burden test and inquire whether the restriction is closely
connected to the legislative purpose and proportionate to the
burdens placed on women.283 Foreign decisions regarding abortion
similarly regard the “core” of reproductive privacy, i.e., strict
scrutiny, while non-core privacy restrictions are subject to a
balancing test.284 Under a balancing test, when state interest in
regulating abortion is compelling, it is weighed against the affected
women’s injuries.285 It is noteworthy that courts perform
individualized qualitative assessments by determining the extent
that each woman’s freedom of private or family life is interfered

279. See generally, Hunbeobjaepanso [Const. Ct.], Apr. 11, 2019, 2017 Hunma
127 (S. Kor.); Unsafe Abortion is Still Killing Tens of Thousands of Women Around
the World” – UN Rights Experts Warn, U.N. H.R. OFF. OF THE HIGHER COMM’R
(Sept. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/LHG8-MAXR]; see also Spyridoula Katsoni, The
Right to Abortion and the European Convention on Human Rights: In Search of
Consensus among Member-States, VOLKERRECHTSBLOG (March 19, 2021)
(referencing the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence as it pertains
to Polish’s “near-absolute abortion ban”) [https://perma.cc/X7C5-VDNR].
280. See supra Part III.B.1 (covering European Court of Human Rights).
281. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 493 (Kan.
2019) (analyzing this case under strict scrutiny).
282. See supra Part III.A (discussing reproductive privacy in the United
States).
283. See supra Part III.A (discussing reproductive privacy in the United
States).
284. See supra Part III.B (discussing reproductive privacy in foreign
countries).
285. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (explaining
the individual and state interests to balance).
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with, as well as the extent to which a woman’s psychological and
bodily integrity is jeopardized.286
Based on the foregoing, there is a clear indication that
reproductive privacy rights are universally protected as
fundamental rights.287 Accordingly, the next section applies the
universal right theory for the right to procreate and the right to a
safe abortion.288
IV. Application of the Universal Right
Part II showed that when essential privacy is restricted, the
universal right theory prompts courts to identify the fundamental
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment without unduly
intruding into the role of Congress.289 The universal right theory
provides unbiased instructions as to the method for judicial
analysis when essential privacy is involved.
Part III explained that the right to procreate and key aspects
of the right to abortion have been universally declared as
fundamental rights.290 When examining sterilization statutes,
strict scrutiny is applied by both foreign and state courts.291
Decreased intellectual capacity does not constitute a compelling
286. See Dilation and Evacuation (D&E), C.S. MOTT CHILDREN’S HOSP., (last
updated October 8, 2020) (“A woman who doesn’t have access to an affordable
abortion specialist in her area or whose access is slowed by legal restrictions may
take several weeks to have a planned abortion. When an abortion is delayed, a
D&E may be necessary.”) [https://perma.cc/2A6F-GV4A]; Abortion (Termination
of Pregnancy), HARVARD HEALTH PUBL’G (January 9, 2019), (“The earlier in
pregnancy this procedure is done, the less the cervix has to be dilated, which
makes the procedure easier and safer.”) [https://perma.cc/6S8U-43M5].
287. See e.g., McDonnell & Linthicum, supra note 276 (showing an example
of a country evolving and expanding abortion laws to provide women with safe,
legal abortions in certain cases).
288. See Brennan, supra note 59, at 24–25 (advocating for the protection of
human dignity and autonomy).
289. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., at 501 (Harlan, J.
concurring) (wresting with the notion of the Fourteenth Amendment and right to
abortion).
290. See Fine, et al., supra note 275 (finding support to determine abortion
rights as fundamental human rights).
291. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Oct.
5, 1977, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 at 23, 999 UNTS. 171, Art. 7, 10. (supporting the
notion that strict scrutiny is applied within sterilization cases).
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state interest in sterilizing a person, and neither does the person’s
limited vocational skills or decreased understanding of social
settings.292
Regarding abortion, many state courts and Canadian courts
apply strict scrutiny to any statute limiting women’s freedom to
terminate their pregnancy.293 A minority of state courts have
adopted a balancing test, and many foreign courts similarly
balance a woman’s non-core abortion right with the corresponding
state interest in protecting fetal life, maternal health, and
morals.294
Regarding the right to abortion, many state courts turn to
strict scrutiny, as do some foreign jurisdictions.295 More and more,
a close nexus is required between abortion restrictions and state
interest because abortions are safe when they are performed at an
early stage of pregnancy.296
When a statute reduces the number of available abortion
operations in a certain locality, a pregnant woman’s right to
abortion is restricted due to the burden that the statute creates.
The physical and psychological consequences to the affected
individual women are also carefully considered when the burden
is weighed against the state interest.297 A statute affecting a very
small number of women might still be unbalanced due to the
damaging effects on the dignity and autonomy of women.298
Virginia’s sterilization statute in Buck v. Bell restricted Carrie
Buck’s right to procreate.299 As analyzed above, however, a right to
292. See Deborah Hardin Ross, Sterilization of the Developmentally Disabled:
Shedding Some Myth-Conceptions, 9 FLA. L. REV. 600, 611 (explaining there is no
compelling interest regarding sterilizing an individual because of a disability).
293. See generally, Hodes & Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461 (Kan.
2019); R. v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 (Can.).
294. See supra Part II.
295. See generally, R. v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30 (Can.).
296. See supra Part III.C (discussing general acceptance of strict scrutiny).
297. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2319 (2016)
(describing what kind of care women need during abortion appointments and
stating Texas had placed too much of a burden on women).
298. See supra Part II for a discussion of decriminalization and
downregulation.
299. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the Virginia
sterilization statute that allowed Carrie’s sterilization because she was
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procreate is essential to a woman’s privacy and is a fundamental
right protected by strict scrutiny.300 In evaluating the Virginia
sterilization statute under a substantive due process framework,
the Supreme Court in Buck v. Bell301 should have applied strict
scrutiny, requiring Virginia to prove that there was a compelling
state interest and that sterilization was the least restrictive means
to achieve the desired end.302
Under the “universal rights theory,” Virginia would have
failed to prove its interest was compelling, because its purpose was
to promote eugenics and the elimination of intellectually
challenged people.303 The statute would have been facially
unconstitutional due to this absence of a compelling state interest
on Virginia’s behalf.304 Alternatively, the Court should have
invalidated Virginia’s sterilization law even if a compelling state
interest could be proven, because irreversible sterilization was far
from being the least restrictive means to meet the state’s
determined by the court to be the “probable potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring”).
300. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict
scrutiny to strike down a sterilization statute that targeted larceny convicts and
noting that the statute concerned a fundamental right to procreate).
301. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (upholding the Virginia sterilization statute
that allowed Carrie’s sterilization because she was determined by the court to be
the “probable potential parent of socially inadequate offspring”).
302. See In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980)
(creating a strict standard for determining whether sterilization is in the best
interest of the individual to protect the individual’s right of privacy); see also N.
Carolina Ass’n for Retarded Child. v. State of N.C., 420 F. Supp. 451, 458
(M.D.N.C. 1976) (declaring that the right to procreate is fundamental and
applying a heightened scrutiny to determine whether a sterilization statute was
invalid as a matter of substantive due process).
303. See In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1981) (holding that compulsory
sterilization of persons with decreased decision-making capacity can no longer be
justified as a valid exercise of governmental authority); see also, People v. Barrett,
281 P.3d 753, 779 (Cal. 2012) (Liu J., dissenting) (“[U]nfounded assumptions of
incapacity and a legacy of paternalism have resulted in serious ‘depriv[ations]
of . . . basic liberty’ with ‘subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.’” (quoting
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541)).
304. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (reasoning that
limitations on fundamental rights are permissible only if they survive strict
constitutional scrutiny—that is, only if the state imposing the restriction can
demonstrate that the limitation is both necessary and narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling governmental interest).
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interests.305 Either way, the Court should have invalidated
Virginia’s sterilization law.
Louisiana’s abortion statute restricted women’s access to
abortion
indirectly
through
the
physician’s
privilege
requirement.306 As discussed previously, most state courts in the
United States would likely apply strict scrutiny in analyzing this
statute.307 Canadian courts would likely use the same standard.308
Additionally, European courts would choose a strict standard that
is reserved for a woman’s core of privacy, freedom to private life,
and bodily integrity, because the Louisiana statue limited the
number of safe abortion procedures available during certain
specified weeks of gestation.309
In many jurisdictions, state courts would conclude that the
Louisiana regulation is not supported by a compelling state
interest and that the privilege requirement is not the least

305. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Hayes, 93 Wash. 2d 228, 238 (1980)
(listing less drastic contraceptive methods, including supervision, education and
training).
306. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (requiring any doctor who
performs abortions to hold “active admitting privileges at a hospital that is
located not further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is
performed or induced and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health care
services”).
307. See Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1138
n.88 (Alaska 2016) (compelling state interest); see also Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 825 (Cal. 1997) (compelling state interest); Gainesville
Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1255 (Fla. 2017) (covering strict
scrutiny for privacy); Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 991 N.E.2d 745, 765–
67 (Ill. 2013) (covering strict scrutiny); Planned Parenthood of Middle Tennessee
v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tenn. 2000) (covering strict scrutiny); Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 239–41
(Iowa 2018) (covering strict scrutiny instead of undue burden test); Hodes &
Nauser, MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 494–97 (Kan. 2019) (covering strict
scrutiny instead of undue burden test); Women of State of Minn. by Doe v. Gomez,
542 N.W.2d 17, 30–32 (Minn. 1995); Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 380–82
(Mont. 1999).
308. See R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 63 O.R. (2d) 281 (Can.) (concluding
that any substantial interference with women’s freedom to receive an abortion is
presumably unconstitutional, unless proven otherwise).
309. See, Part III.B.1 (describing the European approach to protecting the
right to abortion).
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restrictive means to achieve state interests.310 The Louisiana
statute would consequently be held unconstitutional through the
application of this strict scrutiny standard.311
Where courts apply a balancing test, Louisiana’s interest in
maintaining the skill of providers in abortion operations to protect
the health of pregnant women would likely be considered
important and legitimate.312 However, courts may reach different
conclusions regarding whether the privilege requirement is
constitutional considering the relation between the restriction and
purported state interest.313 The balancing test currently used by
foreign courts (e.g., Europe and Korea) and some domestic state
courts examines the nexus between the restriction and the
legislative purpose, and the proportionality between them.314
Under this test, Louisiana would likely fail to show that the
restriction is sufficiently related to its state interest or
proportional compared to the burdens imposed on women wishing
to obtain a safe abortion.315 The connection to the alleged state
interest in protecting maternal health is weak because the
qualifications of physicians are already regulated under the

310. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122,
1138 n.88 (Alaska 2016) (finding that a provision governing notification of parents
by physician was not the least restrictive means of achieving the State’s
compelling interests, and thus violated minors’ fundamental right to privacy).
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007) (upholding the
state’s prohibition of partial-birth abortions); Harris v. W. Ala. Women’s Ctr., 139
S. Ct. 2606, 2607 (2019) (affirming the invalidation of the dismemberment
abortion ban).
313. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848–49, 877 (1992)
(holding that a state regulation is unconstitutional if it has the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion).
314. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 632–
36 (N.J. 2000) (measuring the extent of restriction upon abortion); Moe v. Sec’y of
Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387, 402–05 (Mass. 1981) (balancing the women’s
freedom against state interest).
315. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (explaining that a State has a legitimate
interest in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may
become a child, but holding that a state regulation is unconstitutional if it has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion).
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national licensing regime and common abortion procedures are
safe to women.316
In general, abortion procedures are performed by a licensed
provider in a safe environment, and the specific type of procedure
is mostly decided based on the patient’s gestational age.317 As such,
Louisiana’s interest is not adequately supported by scientific
findings.318 If there is a concern for medical complications following
an abortion, the licensing body would decide on the providers’
qualifications.319 Additionally, if one or more providers in a certain
geographic “cease practicing,”320 many women seeking an abortion
in the served area would be adversely affected.321 The chance to
obtain a less invasive abortion would proportionally decrease,
because the provider shortage would lead to delays in the
performance of abortion procedures.322 The privilege restrictions
would burden pregnant women without serving its goal, and even
sacrifice the state’s interest in protecting women’s health.323 For
316. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2316 (2016)
(finding only a tangential relationship to the state’s interest and holding the
restriction unnecessary).
317. See Grimes et. al., supra note 256 (describing how abortions are “the
safest procedures in contemporary practice, with case-fatality rates less than one
death per 100,000 procedures”).
318. See June Med. Services LLC v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 535 (M.D.
La. 2016) (finding that abortions in Louisiana in the years before the enactment
of the statute were “very safe procedures with very few complications” and that
the “burdens [caused by increased travel distances to abortions clinics] include
the risks from delays in treatment including the increased risk of self-performed,
unlicensed and unsafe abortions”); see also, HARVARD HEALTH PUBL’G, supra note
286 (“The earlier in pregnancy this procedure [abortion] is done, the less the
cervix has to be dilated, which makes the procedure easier and safer”).
319. See Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. at 493 (“Hospitals may deny privileges or
decline to consider an application for privileges for myriad reasons unrelated to
competency.”).
320. June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 814 (5th Cir. 2018).
321. See C.S. MOTT CHILDREN’S HOSP., supra note 286 (“A woman who doesn’t
have access to an affordable abortion specialist in her area or whose access is
slowed by legal restrictions may wait several weeks to have a planned abortion.
When an abortion is delayed, a D&E may be necessary.”).
322. See HARVARD HEALTH PUBL’G, supra note 286 (“The earlier in pregnancy
this procedure [abortion] is done, the less the cervix has to be dilated, which
makes the procedure easier and safer.”).
323. See id. (same).
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these reasons, Louisiana’s statute would likely be held
unconstitutional using the balancing test.324
The substantial obstacle test is not a supportable standard
under the universal right theory. It is unclear whether Louisiana’s
statute would be upheld under the substantial obstacle test.325
Because some state courts that use the substantial obstacle test do
not assess the exact burdens on women caused by the regulation,
these courts would likely conclude that the statute is
constitutional.326
V. Conclusion
This Article examines the validity of the universal right theory
in reproductive rights.327 Using the universal right theory, freedom
essential to human dignity and autonomy will be protected by the
judicial branch.328 This Article concludes that a right of procreation
is a universally protected fundamental right, which demands
examination under strict scrutiny.329 With regards to abortion
rights, there is no universal consensus, but there is an emerging
consensus that key aspects of the right to abortion are
fundamental rights, because securing access to a safe abortion is
324. See id. (same); see also C.S. MOTT CHILDREN’S HOSP., supra note 286 (“A
woman who doesn’t have access to an affordable abortion specialist in her area or
whose access is slowed by legal restrictions may wait several weeks to have a
planned abortion. When an abortion is delayed, a D&E may be necessary.”).
325. See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570, 577 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993) (finding that a statute requiring physicians to provide woman seeking
abortion with certain information and to obtain signed consent forms did not
create a substantial obstacle so it was constitutional).
326. See supra Part II.A (discussing embodiments of the universal right
theory for essential liberty).
327. See supra Part II (discussing universal rights of human dignity and
autonomy).
328. See supra Part II.B (discussing making the universal right theory work
for reproductive privacy).
329. See Simon, supra note 22 (demonstrating that foreign courts as well as
state courts have recognized the right to procreate and key aspects of the abortion
right as fundamental rights); see also, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)
(“Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state
interest, and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake.”) (citations omitted).
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necessary for a person’s dignity and autonomy—the core of
privacy.330 As to restrictions that indirectly affect women’s
reasonable access to safe abortions, a growing number of foreign
and domestic courts require the government to prove its important
legitimate or compelling interest and the regulation’s connection
and proportionality under a balancing test.331 The universal right
theory is a useful guiding principle for essential privacy cases, and
should be used in place of Buck v. Bell.332 Therefore, the “more
searching judicial review” toward the protection of essential
privacy should be supported.333

330. See Simon, supra note 22; see also supra Part III (showing that freedom
to procreate is becoming universally recognized as a fundamental right and
highlighting that reproductive freedom underpins human dignity and autonomy).
331. See supra Part III (explaining that a right of procreation and key aspects
of a right of abortion are universally declared as fundamental rights).
332. See supra Part II (discussing universal rights of human dignity and
autonomy); but see, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a
sterilization statute).
333. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 880 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

